


Seapower and Insurrection

**The Peninsular Warfare
During the Napoleonic Wars
By Virgilio Ilari**



Sea Power and Insurrection: The Peninsular Warfare during the Napoleonic Wars

Virgilio Ilari

Emeritus Associate Professor of Military History, Catholic University, Milan; Chairman of the Italian Society for Military History

The Western intervention in the Libyan Civil War (2011) was, after Kosovo (1999) and Afghanistan (2001), the third and improved case of a new type of *Blitzkrieg* that combines air power and insurrection, the latter acting as a force multiplier. Insurrections can neither be invented, nor simulated, but air power enables the Western Powers to give direct operational support to all potential insurrections without having 'boots on the ground' apart from special forces, military advisors and intelligence officers charged with detecting targets and controlling insurgents. Of course, air power is not yet ubiquitous. Yet, discrete airbases in the Fezzan could extend AFRICOM's (United States Africa Command) range over Central Africa, improving the strategic LOC between the Mediterranean and the Indian Oceans. This would be a good step for strongly counteracting the Chinese soft penetration in Africa and realizing the strategy that Cecil Rhodes imagined on the eve of railways and ironclads.

The 'immaculate intervention'¹ in Libya is more coherent with the ideology of contemporary Western Wars than was the strategy that has actually been carried out since 2003 in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Bush Doctrine, indeed influenced by a sort of 'rightist' Trotskyism, justified the war on Terror as a prosecution of the 1941-1945 crusade for 'Freedom and Democracy' against the 'New Hitlers.' Yet, once the boots were on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan, the 1945 style rapid and triumphal liberation converted itself into an unlimited and stressful occupation. Significantly, the US Army officially renamed the twin interventions as the 'Long War.' In fact, they are the longest wars of the American military history in stark contrast with the administration's label of 'War on Terror.'

¹ Friedman, George, "Immaculate Intervention: The Wars of Humanitarianism," in *STRATFOR*, 5 April 2011.

The NATO support for the anti-Gaddafi insurrection is also coherent with the Western way of waging war. In the Second World War, the Allied Powers sustained resistance and insurrection in the countries occupied by the Axis Powers. Many documents about it, coming from the British National Archives, are included in the series *Conditions and Politics in Occupied Europe 1940-45*, made available on-line five years ago by the Thomson Gale Publishers.

However, the anti-Nazi and anti-Japanese resistances were too largely sustained by the USSR and the local communist parties to be perceived as a typical aspect of Western warfare. In addition to this, all the revolutions and insurrections, occurring after 1945 outside Eastern Europe, were against Western occupation or influence. Thereafter, the Western strategic thought perceived insurrection and revolutionary war as 'subversive' or 'psychological' warfare, ultimately directed by the Soviet Union and the communist parties.

Paradoxically, the concern for counteracting potential communist or pro-Soviet insurrections in the Western European and developing countries led the Western Alliance to learn the European Resistance military lesson from the perspective of the German occupants, rather than from the liberators. Thereafter, Western military studies of unconventional warfare were focused mainly upon counter-insurgency, including a deep analysis of the German Anti-partisan warfare. During the Cold War and the Decolonization (i.e. during the happy *Pentekontaetia* of the last century, and of my life!), the Western World did not plan, but instead feared insurrections!

In 1808, Murat's General Pietro Colletta could write as a truism that "*the insurrectional warfare is the system preferred by England.*"² In 1934, Sir Basil Liddell Hart published a masterpiece on T. E. Lawrence and the Arab guerrilla, and during WWII he advocated the Allied support to resistance movements against German and Japanese occupation. In 1967, quite ironically, he instead warned about the 'disadvantages' of the people's war, quoting Dr. Johnson's historic remark that "*patriotism is the last refuge of a scoundrel*" and praising the 'relatively humane' manner in which the German generals counteracted the resistance movements in the occupied countries at least those of Western Europe.³

2 Colletta, Pietro, "Colpo d'occhio per la riconquista dell'isola di Capri (28/29 September 1808)," in Broccoli, Umberto, *Cronache militari e marittime del Golfo di Napoli e delle Isole Pontine durante il decennio francese (1806-1815)*, USSME, Rome, 1953, p. 317-324.

3 Liddell-Hart, Basil, "Lessons from Resistance Movements: Guerrilla and Non-violent," in Roberts, Adam (Ed.), *The Strategy of Civilian Defense*, Faber & Faber, 1967 = *Civilian Resistance as a Defense*, Stackpole Books, 1968 = *Civilian Resistance as a National Defence. Non-violent Action against Aggression*, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth-Baltimore-Victoria, 1969, p. 228-246.

See also Bond, Brian, *Liddell Hart. A Study of his Military Thought*, Cassell, London, 1967, p. 206-210.

The fall of the USSR in 1991 ended not only the Cold War, but also the era of the struggle for world power. The Western Empire, founded by the United Kingdom and inherited by the United States, lost its third and last global competitor after France and Germany. This epochal event changed the strategic posture of the West. In April 1999, the Atlantic Alliance celebrated its 50th anniversary, transforming itself from a regional and defensive alliance into a global and offensive one. Thereafter, Western strategic thought rediscovered insurrection warfare. As a further fringe benefit of the victory, the re-appropriation of the subversive interventionism by the Western Empire divided and ultimately disarmed the leftist and pacifist opposition, whose generational identity was nourished by the myth of popular resistance and insurrection against tyrants.

Meanwhile, the Western capability of power projection abroad evolved from sea power to air power, thus extending its frontiers far beyond "*the coasts of the enemy*."⁴

However, in the age of sea power, the Western capability to sustain and exploit insurrections had a range far greater than that of Continental Powers. Prussia, Austria and Russia could only act within their frontiers or in neighboring territories, activating and supporting freedom-fighters or insurgents with liaison officers and light cavalry raids instead of landing parties. Both Spain and France spent their limited sea powers to retaliate against England with seaborne subversive operations in Ireland, Scotland, Canada and India.

Considered in the frame of the 18th Century 'World' Wars, seaborne subversive operations were only diversionary operations with limited aims. Take for example the French support to Bonny Prince Charlie's landing in Scotland, that was ended by the Jacobite defeat at the Battle of Culloden (1746), or consider the Landing of French émigrés at Quiberon by the Royal Navy (1795), and the landing of Cuban exiles in the Bay of Pigs (1961).

Nevertheless, since the War of the Great Alliance (1688-1697) seaborne subversive diversions have become a chief military skill of England. Not only did the British land and sea forces learn from their experience in joint operations, but also a series of specific organizations, weapons and machines were developed: Joseph Robinson, a military engineer, published in 1763, under the title *The British Mars*, "several schemes and inventions" of reconnaissance, transport, landing and bombardment vessels, scaling ladders, bridges to cross ditches, *et cetera*.

⁴ Admiral of the Fleet John Arbuthnot Fisher 1st Baron Fisher of Kilverstone, 1841-1920. "*The frontiers of England are the coasts of the enemy: We ought to be there five minutes before war breaks out.*"

The Royal Navy's capability to operate ashore was the essential requirement not only for amphibious operations, but also for seaborne subversive ones.

Different from the contemporary airborne subversions, the range of seaborne ones was limited to the coastal provinces of the enemy. In reality, civil insurrections could not be continuously sustained by sea, except with intelligence and an unlimited amount of money and supplies.

Since 1683, when the Republic of Genoa was forced into submission by the French naval bombardment, the impervious territory of 'The Superb' was the greater geo-strategic obstacle to the cooperation between the Mediterranean Fleet (established in 1690) and the Sabaudian Army, thus thwarting the strategic exploitation of the Camisard (1702-1715) and Royalist (1793) insurrections in South-Eastern France. In 1708, the Allied Land Forces failed in their attempt to take Toulon and, in 1793, could not hold the position there under the French Republican counter-offensive. In 1746, and again in 1800, the tenacious resistance of the city of Genoa, under the French commanders Richelieu and Masséna, weakened the Allied sea-and-land cooperation and frustrated even the peasant insurrections that erupted in 1799-1800 along the Ligurian Apennines. The Mediterranean Fleet could not sustain Royalist insurrection in Southern France before the 1815 campaign. However, the Mediterranean was the decisive front in the historical French-British struggle for world supremacy.⁵ Both Mahan's works on sea power and Liddell Hart's indirect approach originated from the study of British naval strategy in the wars of French Revolution and Empire.

Before Mahan and Liddell Hart, the British resistance against Napoleon was classified as a 'Fabian' strategy,⁶ reminiscent of the *cunctatio* adopted by Quintus Fabius Maximus against Hannibal after the *Pugna Cannensis* (216 B.C.). Later on, the Continental military literature preferred to rename such defensive warfare as *Ermattungsstrategie*⁷ (exhaustion strategy), as Hans Delbrück labeled the strategies of Pericles in the first phase of the Peloponnesian War and of Frederick the Great in the War of the Seven Years. However, the term 'Fabian' remained in the Anglo-Saxon military vocabulary,⁸ and the Fabian Society, founded in 1884, borrowed its name

⁵ Corbett, Julian, *England and the Mediterranean: A Study on the Rise and Influence of British Power within the Straits, 1603-1714*, London, Longmans, Green & Co., 1904, two volumes.

⁶ See, f. e., the Lecture VI, N. 24, in the "Notes from lectures addressed to the Gentlemen Cadets, R. M. College, Sandhurst," by Captain Edmond Walker, R. E. (*Military Elements*, York Town, Albion Printing Office, 1868, pp. 103-104). The Author illustrates the Fabian strategy, aiming to "avoid a decisive action," by the Wellington's Portuguese campaign of 1810.

⁷ See Gerber, Paul, "Ermattungsstrategie zur See im 17 und 18. Jahrhundert," in Laxy, Bernhard (Ed.), *Delbrück-Festschrift: gesammelte Aufsätze, Professor Hans Delbrück zu seinem 60. Geburtstag* (11 November 1908), Berlin, 1908, p. 213. Reprint Scientia-Verlag, 1979.

⁸ Bartholomees, J. Boone Jr., "A Survey of Strategic Thought," in *Ibid.* (Ed.), *U.S. Army War*

precisely from the then current military terminology, thus declaring itself a gradualist rather than a revolutionary route to socialism.

During the 1792-1815 'World' War,⁹ seaborne subversions gradually lost their original character of mere tactical diversions, becoming a true strategy, and even a rather romantic, Whiggist ideology. The first experience of the British Mediterranean Fleet, under the commander-in-chief Sir Samuel Hood and Lord Jervis, was with the two Corsican insurrections, against France in 1794 and against Britain in 1796. The next case, under Nelson, was the anti-Jacobin insurrections that erupted in 1799 in the whole Italian Peninsula. Austria supported the insurgents in Piedmont, Liguria, Tuscany, Romagna and the Marches, in particular by sending liaison officers and small pickets taken from a skilled regiment: 8th Hussars Regiment. The small Austro-Venetian navy also mobilized three lake and two seagoing flotillas in the Adriatic and Upper Tyrrhenian Seas, while a Russian-Turkish fleet with Levantine and Dalmatian crews seized Corfu. Together, they cooperated with the Austrians and the insurgents besieging Ancona, and landed on an Albanian marine battalion, which entered Naples and Rome with the Army of the Holy Faith in our Lord Jesus Christ or 'Sanfedisti.' The British Fleet, in turn, sustained the Sanfedisti re-conquest of the Kingdom of Naples as well as the anti-French insurrections in the Elba and Malta Islands.

The 1799 Italian Insurrection had a great impact, comparable to the Italian Resistance against the German occupation that lasted from 1943-1945. In fact, the latter mobilized 200,000 active partisans over a period of twenty months in Central-Northern Italy, from a total population of 25 million. In 1799, during a period of seven months, at least 100,000 partisans were mobilized. In the whole Peninsula except the North-Eastern corner, then under Austrian rule - with a population of about 10 million inhabitants, 30,000 fell. Also, the military impact of the 1799 insurrections was very important, weakening the French Western and Southern rears during the Austro-Russian offensive from the Adige River to the Alps and wiping out the Neapolitan and Roman Republics. Moreover, the Tuscan insurgents delayed the march of the *Armée de Naples*, thus impeding it from joining the *Armée d'Italie* in Lombardy.¹⁰

Surprisingly, the Second Coalition Headquarters, and then the military historians, gave little or no attention to the Italian 1799 lesson. One reason is that the Austrians, as well as Nelson and the Sicilian Court feared, as Liddell Hart did in 1967, the appalling and uncontrollable aftermath of the insurrection,

College Guide to National Security Policy and Strategy, June 2004, p. 93.

9 Harvey, Arnold D., *Collision of Empires: Britain in three World Wars, 1793-1945*, London, The Hambledon Press, 1992.

10 Ilari, Virgilio, Crociani, Piero and Paoletti, Ciro, *Storia militare dell'Italia giacobina, 1796-1801*, USSME, Roma, 2000, 2 vols.

and thereafter hastened to disband the insurgents and even to erase their memory. Furthermore, the 'Italian 1799' was not a national resistance like the Austrian, Spanish, Russian, and German, ones against Napoleon, but rather it was a fierce class and civil war between peasants fighting under the bloody flag of the Holy Virgin, and the bourgeois fighting to defend not only the revolution but first and foremost their lives and proprieties against *Jacquerie*. The Republicans called themselves 'Patriots' or 'The Nation,' and they supported the French 'liberators' with at least 30,000 professional or volunteer combatants. They were defeated, persecuted and exiled, but the first Restoration was too weak and ephemeral to eradicate the opposition of the leading class. The former Republicans returned to power between 1800 and 1805, converting themselves into Bonapartists. And Napoleon's reforms could not be wiped out by the Second Restauration.

Later, the pro-French bourgeoisie became the leading class of the Risorgimento and built up both the new national identity and the first national historiography, ignoring, minimizing or discrediting the tough legitimist opposition.

During the war of the Third Coalition, Austria tried to provoke insurrections in the rear of the *Armée d'Italie* and called the *Landwehr* in her Western and Southern territories. The Battle of Austerlitz ended the war, but the patriotic enthusiasm of 1805 was the social and political premise for the national resistance of 1809 and 1813, the latter involving even Prussia. Clausewitz spent a chapter of *Vom Kriege* on the *Volksbewaffnung*, i.e. the armament of the people. The *Landwehr* epic became a component of the German *Sonderweg*, and it was exploited by German propaganda when the Allied forces entered the territory of the Third Reich.¹¹ Later, Carl Schmitt dedicated a keen analysis to it in his *Theorie des Partisanen* (1963).

In 1805, 1809, and 1813, popular resistance also involved the Austrian and former Venetian provinces bordering the Adriatic Sea. The Italian Peninsula too was involved, albeit under different circumstances. In 1806-1807, Calabria was even the laboratory of what we can call 'Peninsular Warfare,' which was later applied by the Royal Navy in the other two Mediterranean Peninsulas: the Balkan and the Iberian.

Evacuated by the Anglo-Russian army, and abandoned for the second time by the Court in January 1806, the Kingdom of Naples was easily occupied by the new multi-ethnic *Armée de Naples*, with the exception of Gaeta, now in Southern Latium, which was supplied by the Royal Navy and resisted until

¹¹ See *Kolberg*, a superb 1944 color film directed by Veit Harlan, celebrating Gneisenau and his defense of 1807.

19 July. The siege diverted a third of the French forces, impeding Masséna from reinforcing Reynier's Division in Calabria as it was almost destroyed on 4 July by a British Division under General Stuart when it landed near Maida. However, Stuart did not exploit his success and soon re-embarked for Sicily, thus erasing both Maida's tactical victory and the Borbonic resistance at Gaeta.

In a famous essay on the Battle of Maida, Sir Charles Oman, author of the monumental *History of the Peninsular War* (1902), saw a taste of Wellington's victories over Napoleon's marshals in the British victory in Calabria. In particular, he demonstrated that technical progress in the firearm field, and in that of discipline, had already re-established the supremacy of the linear order over the deep order, the column attack with which the French had, up until then, defeated Austrians, Prussians and Russians. Subsequent studies had mainly contested the Omani reconstruction and interpretation of the Battle of Maida, but had highlighted the other evident analogy between Stuart's campaign in Calabria and those exploitations of naval supremacy and internal resistance by a regular army of the future Duke of Wellington in Portugal and Spain. Nowadays, after the works of Piers Mackesy¹² and those of Christopher Hall,¹³ we see that, in fact, the opposite happened. And that it was actually the navy that exploited the army.

Under the indifference of the king, Queen Carolina tried to coordinate the resistance from Palermo in the Continental provinces of the Kingdom. Different from that of 1799, the appeal to insurrection made by Ferdinand IV in January 1806 initially went unheeded, but the insurrection was later provoked by the brutal requisitions and retaliations of the hungry invaders and hardened by the barbarian feuds between Calabrian families and towns under the political banners of 'Giuseppisti' and 'Borboni.' The Austrian 'Bitch from Palermo,' who was hated by King George III and his British commanders in Sicily, was initially supported by Sir William Sidney Smith (1764-1840) who was a true Lawrence-style maverick. In 1799, with only a single ship and four friends, he stopped the advance of the French *Armée d'Orient* at Saint Jean d'Acre, Syria. Again with a single man-of-war (HMS *Pompée*, a former French manowar), between May 1806 and February 1807, the young rear-admiral attacked the French LOC between Gaeta and Northern Calabria, landing several free corps of Bourbon partisans and sustaining the insurgents and the coastal towns besieged by the French: Maratea and Amantea.

¹² Mackesy, Piers, *The War in the Mediterranean 1803-1810*, London-New York-Toronto, Longmans, Green & Co., 1957. The most important source about the Italian front of the Mediterranean War are the recollections of Sir Henry Bunbury, *Narrative of Some Passages in the Great War with France from 1799 to 1810*, Richard Bentley, London, 1854 (reprint 1927).

¹³ Hall, Christopher, *Wellington's Navy. Sea Power and the Peninsular War 1807-1814*, Chatham Publishing - Stackpole Books, London - Pennsylvania, 2004.

The British generals disregarded insurgents and discredited Smith in their correspondences with London.¹⁴ Meanwhile, however, the political climate at home had changed. On 11 February 1806, Sir William Wyndham Grenville, then 1st Baron Grenville, was appointed prime minister and formed a national unity government (the 'Ministry of All the Talents'). This political change implied a change of the British strategy against Napoleon as well. Indeed, Grenville was the leader of the party that focused on the fighting on the continent as the key to victory, in opposition to Henry Dundas's faction, which favored war at sea and in the colonies. Additionally, Grenville sustained the Catholic emancipation and was inclined to the Whig idea, now advocated from Vienna by Sir Robert Adair (1763-1855), to put the Pope at the head of a 'Catholic Vendée' against Napoleon. The project survived the Grenville Ministry, despite its dismissal in March 1807, and was determined only by the Catholic question. Then, in the summer of 1808, after the French occupation of the Papal States, a British frigate was sent to cruise on the Roman coast to embark Pius VII. Fouché's police, however, foiled the attempt to exfiltrate him.

The last attempt to have Italy surge against Napoleon was made by Lord William Bentinck, Wellington's most famous rival, who looked forward to transforming Italy into 'his' Peninsula. To fulfill his goal, Bentinck deployed his small, personal army in Sicily, which was made up of Italian POWs captured in Spain (the so-called 'Italian Levy'), plus some similar Greek and Calabrian formations. In the fall of 1813, Austrian special forces landed on the Po River's mouth to organize an uprising in Romagna, with the intention of heading for Piacenza and reuniting with the Italian Levy. In fact, the latter landed between Pisa and Leghorn, but was quickly sent back to the ships when its commander realized that the conditions to provoke an insurrection were not present there.¹⁵

The events suggest some military and historical considerations. 'Peninsular' is the geographical term chosen by British historiography to define the war fought in Spain and Portugal against Napoleon. Yet, 'Peninsular' may also be applied to define Admiral Smith's fighting methods or war techniques. Smith was censored by national historiography, which almost without exception abided by the point of view of his detractors within the British Army. Yet, the kind of war he invented in 1806 was successfully applied in 1809-1813, not on the whole of the Iberian Peninsula, but on its Eastern Coast and also in the Adriatic and Ionian Seas where he obtained the most relevant successes on the strategic level: he neutralized the grandiose plans of the new Alexander

¹⁴ Ilari, Virgilio, Crociani, Pierro and Boeri, G., *Le Due Sicilie nelle guerre napoleoniche*, USSME, 2008, 2 vol.

¹⁵ Ilari, Virgilio, Crociani, Pierro and Boeri, G., *La Sardegna nelle guerre napoleoniche e le legioni anglo-italiane*, Widerholdt Frères, Invorio, 2007.

the Great by the means of four frigates and two-thousand men.

Similar to what happened in 1808-1810 from the Pyrenees to Tarragona, the attack on Calabria (*i.e.* the Battles of Maida and Mileto and some landings and coastal attacks) was only a part of Smith's strategic plan, whose linchpin was the Islands of Ponza and Capri. Their main goal was neither to occupy Calabria nor to free Naples, but simply to disperse and wear out the highest possible number of French troops on the communication line between Naples and Cosenza. Napoleon understood this plan very well when on 16 April 1806, he cut it short by denying the reinforcement request writing back brusquely: "*Il n'y a que trop de troupes à Naples!*"

This result was obtained and maintained all along the duration of the war; although in 1807 Napoleon recovered some of his troops to needlessly occupy the Ionian Islands, which were evacuated by the Russians. In 1811, after distracting an English Division from the Spanish theater, he could finally replace the *Armée de Naples* with Murat's new army, which was constituted of those natives and 'Neapolitanized' mercenaries who would irreverently stab him in the back three years later.

The second element of the Peninsular warfare was taking advantage of the intolerance for the ragged-person occupation, which instead of bringing wealth as it happened in Apulia in 1801-1802 and 1803-1805 brought confiscations, extortions and retaliation to the countrymen and peasants. They were squeezed and looted to feed not only the occupation troops, but also the town inhabitants, who became increasingly parasite-like even before the economic siege and the political discrimination of the establishment. The intolerance did not evolve into resistance and guerilla warfare everywhere. Although Spanish guerillas became world famous, guerilla warfare only interested Northern Spain. Many Spanish provinces collaborated with the French, exactly as it happened in the Kingdom of Naples, where guerilla warfare was propagated similar to a fire in Calabria and for some months also in Basilicata and in the Principality of Citra. Yet, it extinguished itself quickly in Abruzzo and 'Terra di Lavoro'.¹⁶

The Spanish guerilla warfare was only one of the aspects of a wider national resistance movement, which was missing in the whole Kingdom of Naples. There was a Bourbon Resistance, maybe an ambiguous Catholic resistance, but not a national, 'Neapolitan' or even 'Calabrian' Resistance. These identities indeed existed culturally speaking, but not politically. Centuries of history

¹⁶ 'Terra di Lavoro' is the name of a historical region of Central-Southern Italy. It corresponds roughly to present-day Southern Latium and Northern Campania. It means literally 'Land of Work,' but it derives from the ancient Liburia, a territory north of Aversa (Caserta Province), which took its name from the ancient tribe of the Leborini.

transformed the Esperides Garden into Planet Venus, where the autonomy is jealously protected not by the means of the sword on the defensive walls, but indeed at the dining table and in bed, with attached *grand-guignol* of betrayals, poisonings and massacres. Maybe, the only *dominium*, which was not Neapolitanized completely was the Austrian one in 1707-1734, and, for this reason too, it left neither regrets nor historiography. To Neapolitanize Charles of Bourbon's state, one had to wait for that eccentric figure of Charles's son, Ferdinand, but the Corsicans' state (*i.e.* that of Giuseppe Bonaparte and Saliceti) was already 'one face, one race.'

Smith lit the fuse of the gunpowder barrel, but Calabrian gunpowder was not Spanish. As stated by King Joseph, It was the 'war of the poor against the rich.' Yet it was, "*the war of poor people, of those who do not have a job, against the upper class,*" as Stuart explained to Fox. This is not to be confused with class war, which presumes a collective conscience, not the mere personal identity. It was for this reason that the Calvinist General Jean-Louis Ebénézer Reynier, transformed by the very same philanthropic rigorism in a merciless equalizer, could arm the rich against the poor, bend the guerrilla warfare through the civil war, and pay back the atrocities with greater atrocities. It was for this very same reason that the actions and the valor of the Italian Resistance against the French did not create a nation state.

Table 1 : Foreign Secretaries and War Office Heads in 1801-15

Date of Variation	Foreign Secretaries	War Office Heads	Secretaries of State for War and the Colonies
3.1801	Lord Hawkesbury	Henry Addington	Lord Hobart
5.1804	Lord Harrowby	William Pitt, Jr.	Lord Camden
1.1805	Lord Mulgrave	Idem	Idem
7.1805	Idem	Idem	Viscount Castlereagh
2.1806	Charles James Fox †	Lord Grenville	William Windham
9.1806	Grey, Visc. Howick	Idem	Idem
3.1807	George Canning	Duke of Portland	Viscount Castlereagh
10.1809	Marquis of Wellesley	Spencer Perceval	Lord Liverpool
12.1809	Earl of Bathurst	Idem	Idem
4.1812	Viscount Castlereagh	Idem	Idem
6.1812	Idem	Lord Liverpool	Earl of Bathurst

Table 3 : British Naval Units in the Mediterranean 1803-10 (Mackesy)

Date	Ships of the line	4 th -6 th rates	Sloops	Total*	Manpower	Low Thyrreanean	
						F	C
1803 July	11	10	6	32	10,365	-	-
1804 January	9 ^o	10	7	31	9,088	-	-
1804 July	13	13	9	46	13,551	-	-
1805 January	12	12	10	41	13,022	-	-
1805 July	10	12	10	37	11,071	-	-
1806 January	25	17	15	64	22,135	-	-
1806 July	20	18	12	55	18,627	1	2
1807 January	21	18	18	60	20,331	1	2
1807 July	27	22	20	74	25,705	1	3
1808 January	27	18	19	70	24,263	1	3
1808 July	29	27	21	84	28,514	1	3
1809 January	21	25	21	72	22,709	(1)	3
1809 July	25	24	23	78	25,408	1	3
1810 January	30	22	24	82	27,991	(2)	3

* Minor ships included. ° 3rd rate. F = Frigates. C = Corvettes.

Table 4 : British Land Forces in the Mediterranean 1803-13 (Mackesy *et al.*)

Date	Gibraltar	Malta	Sicily	Total
1803 July	4,712	4,670	-	9,382
1804 January	4,216	6,571	-	10,787
1804 July	4,435	7,543	-	11,978
1805 January	3,536 §	7,435 §	-	10,971 §
1805 June	3,318	6,680	-	9,998
1805 July	5,912	9,024	-	14,936
1806 January	6,401	n.a.	-	19,400
1806 July	6,452	4,550	13,556	24,558
1807 January	6,917	5,749	20,158	32,824
1807 July	6,432	6,061	19,041 a	31,554
1808 January	7,851	5,498	11,839	25,188
1808 July	5,552	5,466	17,766	28,784
1809 January	5,843	4,854	17,326	28,023
1809 July	4,160	4,418	18,008	26,586
1810 January	5,231	4,511	20,539 b	30,281
1810 July	6,064	4,568	23,046 b, c	33,678
1811 January	5,030	4,120	18,550 b	27,700
1813 25 Aug.	3,135	3,672	15,701 b	22,508

Webster University Geneva



Counterinsurgency

Security Forum 2011

Alexandre Vautravers
Matthew Goulding (eds.)

Webster
UNIVERSITY