"Gallantry and Discipline"

An analysis of the outlook and morale of British soldiers in the Peninsular War and Waterloo Campaign, (1807 - 15).

Mark Clayton, U. K.

Part 1

Military history has been primarily studied from the political and strategic point of view, the exposition of wars and campaigns in terms of states, armies, corps and divisions. The minds and methods of great war leaders of the past have attracted the most interest from historians, and before the nineteenth century are the main source of military history from their papers and manuscripts, and from what past historians have written about them. The vast majority of 'ordinary soldiers', the rank and file, are for the most part, silent in their illiteracy. However from the Napoleonic Wars, we have for the first time a large number of writings from men of lower rank, including some non-commissioned officers and private soldiers.

In Britain this was due to a variety of circumstances;- the increase in literacy along with industrial growth, and the spread of devotional Protestantism, (Methodism in England, and particularly Presbyterianism in Scotland), meant that sons of professional men, merchants, lawyers and clergy could, because of their education, become officers in the army. They broadened the social basis of the officer corps, it was no longer the traditional monopoly of the aristocracy and gentry. The recruiting of soldiers from the militia, from 1805 onwards, also facilitated the entry of educated men into the army. Being a conscript force, the militia drew a wider sample of society than that provided by the voluntary recruitment of the army, (for most of whom it was the last resort), and therefore provided some educated volunteers who wrote letters, journals and memoirs, (of whom Wheeler [51st Regt.] and Costello [95th Regt.] are two prime examples). The social and political impact of the Napoleonic Wars stimulated the writing and publishing of journals and memoirs and created an audience for those who had taken part in the long struggle. Through these sources, we have for the first time an opportunity to examine the experiences of the soldiers in the field, their attitudes to their commanders, the enemy, and the war in general. Read with care, these sources can prove most useful, especially when the authors are attempting to describe, by diaristic factual details and anecdotes, - experiences which they know to many of their readers (including the historian) will be completely alien. Captain J. Kincaid wrote in his preface, *"In tracing the following scenes, I have chiefly drawn on the reminiscences of my military life, and endeavoured to faithfully convey to the mind of the reader the impression which they made on my own at the time of their occurrence".*

To understand an alien experience, is I would suggest the principal interest in examining the attitudes of British soldiers in the Napoleonic Wars. For no modern historian, especially those who have not fought in a war, can fully comprehend what it was like to have lived with Wellington's army, or to have taken part in battles like Albuera, Vitoria or Waterloo. More specifically, an examination of the troops' mental outlook will help us to understand the morale of British soldiers, - their discipline and confidence, or 'team spirit'. It hardly needs to be stated that morale is the key factor which determines the fate of battles, (and therefore often of wars), - and an appreciation of it, and how it was influenced, is essential to an understanding of Napoleonic warfare. Likewise, some knowledge of an army's attitude and morale will shed light on its leaders, - their successes and failures; and are an important element to be taken into account in a discussion of strategical questions of the outcome of campaigns and wars.

Let us begin then, by looking at the rank and file, the men most representative of the army. In doing so, surely the first question to be asked is why should men have joined the army at all? For the living conditions of the soldier in peacetime, let alone on campaign, were unattractive to say the least. It was a strictly disciplined life regulated by severe corporal punishments. In 1812 the daily pay for a private in the Line infantry was 1 shilling; in the Foot Guards 1s.1d.; in the Line cavalry 1s. 3d.; in the Life Guards 1s. $11^{3}/_{4}$d., - compared to the average wages of a farm labourer of 14s. 6d. per week. Sixpence per day of the soldier's pay was deducted for his rations, which consisted of 1lb of meat, $1^{1}/_{2}$ lbs of bread and a quart of beer per day, *'' - not sufficient for his subsistence for any great length of time''* (Wellington). Although soldiers were provided with accommodation, this was usually in unsanitary barrack blocks in which the allotted space to each man was only 400 cubic feet, which was less than half the allocation of a convict. Marriage was positively discouraged among the rank and file, and there was always the prospect of being sent to a foreign garrison where there was a much higher risk of death through disease.

Thus, life in the army was tough, and as a volunteer force, tended to mainly attract *'"the very worst members of society'"*. They were men of the lower working classes for whom the hardship of a soldier's life was nothing new, and often who had no alternative means of personal support. There was a large criminal element among recruits, from the wholesale enlistments from gaols and prison-ships, and from men escaping from awkward situations in their local communities. John Stevenson wrote;- *"of those who voluntarily enlist, some few are driven by poverty ..... some have disgraced themselves in their situation of employment, many have committed misdemeanours which expose them to the penalties of the law of the land, and most are confirmed drunkards"*. As shall be seen, drunkenness was rife throughout the army, and during the Peninsular War there was considerable robbery, and some murder, committed by British soldiers against the indigenous populations which Wellington attributed *"to our having so many men who have left their families to starve for the inducement of a few guineas to get drunk"*. Those few guineas, the bounty, which in 1808 was established at twelve guineas for seven years enlistment, or seventeen for life, appear to have been a great incentive. For many recruits it was the largest sum they had or would ever hold, and as there was little else for a soldier to spend his money on, but drink (and women), men like Costello, Harris, and Morris promptly did so.

However, by no means all of the British rank and file were pressed by economic hardship, were criminals or addicted drunkards, - there seem to have been other motivations for enlisting. These are particularly seen in those who joined from the militia, several of whom confessed to patriotic and glamorous motivations; e.g. Morris and Costello were both attracted to the soldier's life by hearing and reading accounts of campaigns, and by the smart ostentatious uniforms of the period. It is likely that many soldiers little knew what they were letting themselves in for when they joined up, and that many were victims of skillful recruiting sergeants. These *"would give a glowing description of their several regiments, describing the victories they had gained and the honours they had acquired,"* - often plying their listeners with strong drink, so that they should first accept the King's shilling, and then not go back on their agreement. Amongst the militia, according to Morris, other coercive measures were sometimes adopted by the recruiting officers, such as long drills and field exercises, *"which were so repressive, that to escape them, the men would embrace the alternative and join the regulars."* Thus it was often a problem to keep new recruits once they were sober again, and *"bounty-jumping"* was fairly common.

It was mainly for officers that the army provided an attractive career, i.e. for those who were educated, and often who had some private income. The pay of junior officers (4s. per day, after 6d. ration deduction for ensigns) was just adequate to live on, but providing one's own equipment required a large extra outlay. A private income was also a great advantage to an ambitious officer who could use it to buy commissions in the more prestigious regiments, or to ascend the ranks, as opportunities became available. Around 18% of promotions in the infantry 1810 - 13 were by purchase, and 45% in the cavalry, and Morris reveals that there was a certain amount of resentment in the army against the ability of wealthy and particularly aristocratic officers, to monopolise the 'crack' regiments. However, by the nineteenth century, British officers were by no means exclusively drawn from the aristocracy and landed gentry who had traditionally commanded the army. Army and navy officers were the largest group who fathered military sons, but the other professions also provided a number, clerics, lawyers, doctors, scientists etc. The largest number of new officers entered from the militia, or were given a free commission on the recommendation of someone above the rank of major. Less than 20% purchased their first commissions, 3.9% came from the Royal Military College, 5.42% rose from the ranks, and 4.5% gained commissions as volunteers. The latter were young gentlemen who, with the permission of a colonel, went on active service with a battalion. All officers were 'officially' gentle men, though as shall be seen, the soldiers had clear ideas of 'gentlemanly' behaviour. Thus being an ''officer and a gentleman'' was a socially applauded, honourable career, which provided a comfortable life particularly in peacetime, but also in war.

On Campaign

Life on the march had a great variety of conditions and experiences for the troops. Without doubt there were great hardships undergone, each ranker carrying up to 70 lbs of kit, on daily marches of ten to twelve miles, with occasional forced marches of up to thirty miles. The weather of course had the greatest influence on conditions, varying to extremes of heat and cold, depending on the time of year and the region of Europe. The only protection against rain was one's greatcoat on the march, natural cover in camp (before 1813), or an overcrowded billet in a village or town. Tents were not issued to the rank and file until 1813 and were an attempt to reduce the large numbers of men incapacitated by illness, the *"natural consequence"* of the fatigues of the camp. Another major source of discomfort was the frequent daily famines or short rations caused by an inefficient supply system. Although based on mules, the best form of transport for the Peninsular terrain, supplies were slow moving, and directed by a commissary that was faced with an enormous task with little previous experience to deal with it. The forward units of light infantry and cavalry often outreached their supplies and went without rations sometimes for several days.

Experience of such hardships enforced their acceptance as there was little to be done about them. As stated above, many soldiers came from working class backgrounds for whom hard, physical work and poor living conditions were not unusual. Most soldiers took a fatalistic attitude towards campaign life, for of course there were also good times on the march, fine weather, plentiful supplies, a comfortable billet or bivouac. Thus, *"if we do suffer privations at times, we have some sunshiney days, and dame fortune often leads us out of difficulty and puts us into possession of all the luxuries of life."* (Wheeler). Veteran soldiers could be quite indifferent, *"I had been in so many changes of plenty and want, ease and danger, that they had ceased to be anticipated either with joy or fear."* ('Thomas' of the 71st.) Though, inevitably, there were grumbles about the commissary, most complaints and discontent seem to have been mainly directed towards the enemy, the reason the troops were there, and therefore the cause of their sufferings. According to Tomkinson, the common talk among the infantry in 1813 was of paying the enemy back for making them walk so far. Wheeler wrote of the wet and muddy retreat to Portugal in 1812, *"But amidst all these difficulties no-one murmured, or if there was any discontent; it was because we were not allowed to give them battle."* This was also the main complaint on the retreat to Corunna which saw the worst conditions experienced by British soldiers in the Peninsular War. On this march, the constant rain, bad provisioning and poor state of health of

many men made life *"rather a burden"* and without the hope of a general engagement, probably many more would have *"abandoned themselves to disease and despair."* Those who did so showed that there came a point when one just gave up, and when the mutually supporting camaraderie of the soldiers broke down in a 'sauve qui peut'.

The hardships and sufferings of a campaign increased the number of incidents of indiscipline amongst the troops, e.g. insubordination, or being drunk on sentry duty, which were punished by flogging. Most sentences were between three hundred, (for minor offences), and eight hundred lashes, (for more serious offences like sacrilege and attempted desertion.), yet there were fifty sentences of 1000 lashes during the Peninsular War. The majority of soldiers seem to have considered flogging to be *"absolutely necessary"* (Anton) to prevent hundreds falling victim to the rapacity ''to be expected from such an heterogeneous mixture of depravity and ignorance as is to be met with in an army.'' (Wheatley). Harris thought it essential, to preserve the army's efficiency and discipline. He recorded that on the retreat to Corunna, when some of the 95th were becoming *"careless and ruffianly in their demeanour,"* General Crauford flogged two for insubordination and so *"saved hundreds from death by his management."*

However, there were some like Morris who agreed with the reformers (e.g. Sir Francis Burdett), that flogging *"invariably makes a tolerably good man bad, and a bad man infinitely worse."* (Morris). But whatever their views on flogging, the soldiers respected those who dispensed it with fairness and humanity, at least by the standards of the day. Most officers seem to have done this, Wellington once declared to a parliamentary committee that *"it was the desire of every commanding officer I have ever seen, and who knew his duty, to diminish corporal punishment as much as possible."* Costello's commanding officer in 1808 rarely resorted to the whip, but punished by extra drill, or by chaining a 6 lb shot to a man's leg for a period of time.

Probably in the hope of obtaining better conditions or possibly from defeatism, many British soldiers deserted to the French and vice versa. Those British who were caught were shot or flogged, but the practice still continued, until 1813 when British victories.and advance through Spain, not surprisingly, made it tail off. Desertion was particularly prevalent in the regiments of the King's German Legion, perhaps the roughest soldiers in the British army, and men without the sense of patriotic duty and regimental pride that motivated other British troops. The mixture of different nationalities in the Legion enabled some men to learn foreign languages to further their chances as deserters. Desertion was almost entirely a phenomenon amongst the rank and file, for officers generally remained sufficiently comfortable to have little incentive to desert.

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Part 2

Although they shared many hardships with the men, such as the severities of the weather and the deficiencies in supplies, many officers could live relatively comfortably for much of the time because they always had priority of billets or bivouac site, and had money to transport their baggage, and to supplement their rations. Wealthier officers could be quite concerned about their table, (at which, if they were senior, they might also feed several subordinates and aides-de-camp); e.g. Lieutenant-General Robert Long, who several times wrote home to England for ''a small supply of eatables'', Wiltshire cheeses, tongues, portable soups, burgundy vinegar, tea etc. But lesser officers too were naturally concerned to maintain and improve their diet, Kincaid once related how he managed to obtain a loaf from two nuns, for meat without bread was ''loathsome''; and in July, 1812 Captain Bragge of the 3rd (King's Own) Dragoons, wrote to his father that he hoped the war would soon be over because he had no butter or spirits, scarcely any vegetables except onions, and was low on honey and cheese. It was generally felt by the rank and file (probably with some justice) that officers, because they were used to more comforts than the men, suffered more from the fatigues of a campaign. Some ''felt sorry to see gentlemen of good fortune and talent exposed to such privations''; but for others, e.g. on the retreat to Corunna, it gave a ''malicious satisfaction'' to see officers worth thousands a year stumbling along with an old blanket around them.

For both officers and men, the main way to relieve the discomforts and sufferings of campaign life was to smoke and get drunk. On the retreat to Corunna, William Green reckoned that ''those who could use tobacco held out the best'', and Wheatley found ''it prevents cold, spends the time and encourages meditation.'' But the troops were most concerned about their drink, ''There is nothing, not even flogging, damps the spirit of a service soldier more than stopping his grog.'' Certainly drunkenness was very widespread, Wheeler wrote that ''drunkenness had prevailed to such a frightful extent that I have often wondered how it was that a great part of our army were not cut off.'' On the retreat to Corunna many drunkards died of exposure sleeping in the snow, or were cut down, or taken prisoner as stragglers. Drunkenness was probably proportionately more widespread among the officers than the men, because they had more money to afford it. Many soldiers spent their meagre pay on cheap Spanish wine to supplement the third of a pint of spirits or quart of beer which was their daily ration (when available). But for some, even this was not enough, particularly when their pay was in arrears, as it usually was, and there was always the incentive to plunder and pillage, for more drink; food to relieve the deficiencies and monotony of their diet, and other usable or saleable items like clothes, jewellry and church plate.

Thus pillaging was carried on by large numbers of soldiers throughout the Peninsular War, despite the penalty of hanging if caught. Tomkinson witnessed four soldiers so executed for plundering in Leiria in October, 1810; and in France in 1814, Wheatley saw a muleteer hanged from the house he had attempted to steal apples from. This was on the orders of the Provost Martial Pakenham, Wellington's brother-in-law who was appointed at the head of a multitude of 'police' to deter plundering in France lest the French population turned against the British as the Spanish did against the French.

The officers' and mens' attitudes towards plundering, and towards the indigenous Portuguese and Spanish populations, most of whom were peasants on subsistence farming, really depended on the situation the soldiers themselves were in. Inevitably there must have been some who cared little about the local population's plight, made worse by the devastation of ravaging armies. Yet many others seem to have been genuinely concerned, and when they had a 'sufficiency of supplies tried to avoid taking necessaries, and even tried to help the peasantry. Soldiers of the 51st Foot gave biscuits to some of the starving poor they passed on the march in early 1811 Wheatley noted in his journal how the poor peasants were reduced to living on chestnuts and sour wine, and how fortunate the people of England were not to know the distress of a country ravaged by contending armies. But the army had to feed itself to continue the war against the French, and the soldiers were naturally concerned about their own welfare; thus with the shortages from a deficient supply system, ''hunger often caused us to do things which we should have been ashamed to do, if we had had plenty'' (J. Green). In July, 1813, Wheeler and his companions in woods near Vitoria took from an old shepherd all his bread, cheese and wine. ''The poor fellow cried. It was of no use, we had not eaten a bit of bread these eleven days. The old man was not far from home and could get more.'' Schaumann deeply regretted having ''to cut the poor people's corn down'', and Surtees hated having from shortage of fuel , to resort ''to the cruel and unchristian like expedient of pulling down houses to obtain tinder''.

Often, however, the point of necessity was stretched or ignored altogether, and the peasants plundered. One market day in July 1809 soldiers and civilians overwhelmed the peasant stalls in Talavera and carried off the produce. The soldiers of the 95th in 1808 were not above hammering flat the buttons of their greatcoats and passing them off as English coin for Spanish wine. Some British soldiers, e.g. Tomkinson, held the view that the Spanish should not mind their corn too much, and should indeed give every assistance, since the British were fighting ''their battles for them'' to clear the French out of Spain.

Generally, the British soldiers did not have a very high opinion of the Portuguese and Spanish. For many, their first experience of the Peninsula was Lisbon, to which the general impression was of ''a dunghill from end to end''; and there were similar complaints about many other Portuguese and Spanish dwelling places, so that it was a remarkable and delightful change to find clean, neat villages in Portugal.

(Wheeler). The Spanish were found, by some British gentlemanly officers at least, to be a ''diminutive race and disagreeable in thin countenance and appearance'' (Do brée), of whom good breeding was not a characteristic. (Wheatley).

The best thing about the Spanish was their women, in whom soldiers traditionally take a considerable interest. In April, 1812 Captain Bragge wrote to his brother, ''I sincerely wish we may be able to penetrate into Spain as the people are in every respect superior to the Portuguese, but in no one particular more so than in the Beauty of the Signoras, who are, generally speaking very pretty and decently clean''. However, the Spanish beauties did not suit every officer's taste, Kincaid longed to feast his eyes on ''the illuminated portion of Nature's fairest works a lady.''

Some British officers also took a considerable dislike to the Spanish taste for bullfights. At one given in honour of Wellington in Madrid on the 31st August, 1812, according to Hennell, many officers hissed and shouted at a horse being gored by a bull. Hennell wrote disdainfully of the Spanish who delighted in ''this scene of blood'', ''These are the men who seldom fail to run away when attacked by the French.''

The general British impression of the Spanish army was of it being ill-clothed, paid, disciplined and organised; a state which was principally the fault of the officers who ''appeared to be utterly unfit to command their men'', full of vain-glory and empty bravado. To a large extent this opinion was justified by the army's performance in the field. From the extraordinary rout of 2000 Spanish troops at Talavera (27th July, 1809), to the flight of the Spanish army at Toulouse (11th April, 1814), the Spanish were singularly unsuccessful and unreliable troops, generally regarded by the British soldiers as ''bad plucked ones'' who would rather run than fight. The Portuguese cavalry were also ''never to be trusted'', but their infantry, retrained and disciplined by British officers were counted brave troops, and by 1811/12 were regarded as almost the equal of British troops. British attitudes then, to the Portuguese and Spanish populations were mixed, varying from humanitarian pity for the peasant poor, to the careless and disdainful feelings for the people and their way of life, that encouraged soldiers to rob, murder and rape.

Their attitudes towards the French were similarly inconsistent. Because of their military performance, the French were respected by British troops. Their repeated defeats on the battlefield were mostly put down to ''their miserable generals'' (Hennell), and the superiority of British tactics (see below); for the courage of the French troops could not be denied; ''while I endeavour to record the gallantry of the British I cannot in justice to a brave enemy be silent in their praise'' (Wheeler). The courage and zeal of the French officers encouraging their men was particularly noted.

Apart from military prowess, attitudes to the French depended on circumstances. On the march, whether advancing or retreating, they were the enemy to be beaten, the reason why the British were there, and the cause of the soldiers' sufferings. They were ''monsieur'', or ''frog eating rascals'', the butt of crude jokes around the campfire. In this impersonal form the enemy could be killed in skirmishes and battles , which were ''them or us'' situations. After the battle of Vimiero, Harris shot a fellow looter because ''he was a French light infantry man, and I therefore took it quite in the way of business, he had attempted my life, and lost his own.''

However, coming face to face with the enemy when neither side was on the offensive, e.g. when foraging, or when units of the two sides were encamped opposite each other for a long period of time, or when French wounded were captured, the enemy became more personal and soldiers' attitudes were more amicable and sympathetic. Indeed, in such situations there was a great deal of fraternisation with the French. Wheeler tells how British and French infantry, both coveting apples in an orchard were soon intermingled, picking them, ''with as much unconcern as if they were belonging to the same service.'' Costello and Tomkinson had chats with French pickets opposite them. The latter and his fellow officers whilst encamped on the Rio Major in December, 1810, were invited by French officers to a play in Santarem, and the British invited the French to horse races, football and dog hunts; but this communication was stopped by a general order, one of several that tried to curtail such fraternisation.

However, between the outposts, peaceable relations were tolerated, and even encouraged. It was considered bad form for sentries to fire at one another, and notice was usually given before an attack so that the sentries who could not influence the battle might get out of the way. French wounded were treated as companions in arms, and often every effort was made towards their comfort, or at least to see that they were not molested by looters and revenge seeking Portuguese and Spanish. For, ''military hatred is never felt for the helpless but against the daring and the capable.'' Soldiers of the 95th pitying the half-starved, distressed condition of the French in Santarem in 1810, shared biscuit rations with them, and exchanged tobacco for brandy. Such fraternisation was principally engaged in by British soldiers, and much less, even in the last months of the war, by German, Spanish and Portuguese troops.

These troops tended to take a much harder and more cruel attitude towards the French, in revenge for the invasion and ravaging of their countries. They, and the French in reply, committed numerous atrocities, such as the torturing and killing of wounded and prisoners. The British generally regarded these atrocities with horror and disgust, Robert Long thought the atrocities committed by the French retreating in March 1811 ''rival led those of the most savage Indian tribes'' and would reflect eternal disgrace on the officers and men who committed them. Thomas of the 71st, found it impossible to pity the dead Frenchmen lying by the road, whose retreat ''resembled more that of famished wolves than men .... every house was a sepulchre, a cabin of horrors.'' Undoubtedly though, the British too committed many acts of cruelty and rapacity both against the indigenous population and enemy troops, e.g. at Vimiero, Harris witnessed an English dragoon and a Portuguese cavalryman pursue and cut down a French officer in cold blood. Yet the British committed far fewer atrocities because, not fighting on their own soil, they were much less motivated by revenge than were the Portuguese, Spanish,and Prussians (Waterloo Campaign); and in not being faced with the extensive guerrilla war that threatened the French supplies and communications, they had no need to make bloody retaliations. Thus, despite the sack of Badajoz, Surtees was ''fully persuaded that there is more humanity and generosity to be found in the breast of an English soldier than any other in the world, for, except when inflamed by drink, I am confident it would be most revolting to his feelings to be ordered to proceed with cool deliberation to the execution of such horrid butcheries as we read of in the armies of other nations.'' Considering the widespread drunkenness in the British army (see above), this perhaps is not saying very much.

The many horrors that British soldiers saw on Campaign, starving peasants, numerous atrocities, not to mention the horror of battlefield casualties (see below), doubtless hardened many men's characters. ''War is a sad blunter of feelings.'' (Harris). They became callous and indifferent to the horrors and suffering they saw, the sight of three ghastly bodies near his pique was all too familiar to Harris in 1808. Wheatley happily slept in his tent at the back of which a man's hand protruded from his grave, exposed by the heavy rains. Thomas of the 71st ''looked over the field of Waterloo as a matter of course, a matter of small concern.''

Yet British soldiers did have a strong concept of the rules of war. The plundering of towns such as Rodrigo and Badajoz was the ''immemorial privilege'' of those who successfully stormed a town which had refused to surrender. It was both explicable and deserved in view of ''the exasperated feelings of the soldiers who by the obstinate resistance of the enemy and the almost incredible difficulties they had been obliged to surmount were wrought to a pitch of fury which no human power could control'' Many officers seem to have concurred with this view, and it is probable that even Wellington accepted the inevitability of plunder, though he was very much against it as a flagrant breach of discipline.

The plundering of the dead and wounded on a battlefield was also an accepted, if distasteful facet of war, and could be quite a major source of income and concern to the rank and file, and an incentive and encouragement to put up with the hardships and risks of campaign life. Harris generally had plenty of money, for he was always straying about and picking up what he could find on the battlefield; and Wheeler at the battle of Nivelle, though wounded in both legs, managed to shoot a French soldier who robbed him, and later crawl over and take back his money and more besides. Officers too undoubtedly took their share of the plunder where they could, but doing so was frowned upon as ungentlemanly, and a bad example to the men, ''if an officer plunders before his men, what may not soldiers be expected to do?'' (Surtees). A horse was the only thing ''that an officer can permit himself to consider a legal prize.'' (Kincaid).

But there were also other rules of war. Flags of truce frequently passed between the two sides, e.g. to be allowed to collect the wounded and bury the dead on a battlefield. Wounded and prisoners were expected not to be physically harmed, though they might be robbed, and it was by no means certain what other treatment they might receive. As soon as he was captured, at Waterloo, Wheatley had his knapsack taken, and later he was dragged along tied to a horse's tail, and almost ridden down by three or four French cavalry as sport. Firing upon unarmed units, such as watering parties, was frowned upon, as was firing on sentries (see above). A 95th Rifleman who shot a French sentry for his knapsack and the food it might contains committed ''a cruelty which no law of arms could justify.'' But on the whole, the British and French at least, respected these rules, and instances of their flouting recorded in letter and memoirs were exceptions worthy of anecdote. As Costello, perhaps with a little exaggeration wrote

'' We anticipated little terror from capture and though we ever found them to be our roughest antagonists, yet we always experienced a most generous opposition; indeed there was, on the whole, such a chivalrous spirit carried on between us, that our men had a kind respect even for a wound inflicted by a Frenchman.'' Writers delighted to record examples of such chivalry; Costello remembered a British Light Dragoon being hissed at by his fellows for refusing to accept a challenge to individual combat with a Frenchman; and a French dragoon being cheered by British cavalry for his intrepidity in fighting his way back through them when cut off from his regiment. Thomas of the 71st, tells how near Sabreira in 1810, a French officer and four men came under a flag of truce to request half of a bullock which had escaped from the French camp to the British, ''which they got for godsake.'' And Wheeler thought it ''delightful to see the very same soldiers, who an hour before were dealing destruction about them, tendering all the assistance in their power to a fallen enemy. What a boast to belong to such a country.''

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PRUSSIAN GENERALS OF 1813

Dr. Heinrich Niebuhr, Germany

This article is intended as a follow on from Mrs Shatsillo's manuscript in issue 10 regarding the correct pronunciation of 'foreign' names. Having lived in Britain for several years now I have also noticed how poorly the indigenous wargamers pronounce the names of European generals, so inspired as I have been I have attempted to follow up the Russian generals of 1813 with their Prussian counterparts. My apologies if this offends some but it is done with a Schleswig-Holstein accent!

I have adopted the same format as previously used to enable familiarity.

Anglisised Name	Pronunciation	Command
Kleist	KLEIST (as in heist)	Prussian Corps, Bohemia
Kluex	CLUE-X	9th Brigade
Pirch	PEA-ERK	10th Brigade
Ziethen	TZEET-UN	11th Brigade
Von Preussen	FON PROY-SEN	12th Brigade
Roeder	RER-DER	c/o Reserve Cavalry, Boh.
Wrangel	VRAN-GULL	Brigade, Reserve Cavalry
Von Mutius	FON MOO-TEE-US	Brigade, reserve Cavalry
Von Thielmann	FON TEE-EL-MUN	Independent Corps, Boh.
Von Gasser	FON GAS-SIR	Brigade, Ind. Corps
Kurland	COO-ER-LAND	Brigade, Ind. Corps
Blucher	BLUE-KE-HARE	Army of Silesia
Yorck	YORK	I Corps, Silesia
Katzler	CATS-LAIR	Adv. Guard, I Corps
Steinmetz	SHTEIN-METS	1st Brigade
Strelitz	SHTRAY-LITS	2nd Brigade
Horn	HORN	7th Brigade
Hunnerbein	HOO-NARE-BINE	8th Brigade
Jurgass	YOU-ER-GAS	Cavalry Reserve, I Corps
Bulow	BEW-LOV	III Corps, Army of North
Homburg	HOM-BOURG	3rd Brigade
Von Schoon	FON SHOW-EN	5th Brigade
Von Hobe	FON HOB-AIR	Cavalry, III Corps
Krafft	CRAVVED	6th Brigade
Oppen	O-PEN	Reserve Cavalry,III Corps
Treskow	TREZ-KOV	Brigade, Res. Cavalry
Sydow	SID-OV	Brigade, Res. Cavalry

I hope that this short dissertation can be of some use. My favourite name of all the above is Hunnerbein, which for those of you who are not aware translates as ''Chicken-Legs''.

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Mark Clayton, U. K.

Part 3

Without doubt, most British soldiers were patriotic. Stories and anecdotes like those above, related in letters and memoirs, were an expression of this patriotism of their pride at being militarily *''amongst the most splendid soldiers in the world''*, who could also be men of humanity and chivalry. There were concepts of the honour of their country and their duty towards it, but it is difficult to see whether these were widely held, particularly amongst the illiterate majority of troops.

Certainly there were some who feared disgrace for their country, e.g. in retreating - such as Thomas of the 71st, but it was probably more the sense of wasted effort and needless sufferings that afflicted most troops. Harris wrote that when they realised they were retreating towards Corunna, the soldiers started to murmur at not being allowed to turn and fight, rather than endure their present toil. However, according to Morris, the 73rd, in battle on the plains of Gardo in Swedish Pomerania, were exhorted by their colonel not to disgrace themselves as the only regiment of English on the field, and *''a hearty cheer from the men was the assurance that they would do their duty.''* Surtees recorded that in the last months of the war in 1814 there was a disposition in both armies to mitigate the miseries of the war *''as much as was consistent with each doing their duty to their country.''*

Yet the concept of honour was mainly a military and personal one, that of British troops as soldiers; - rather than a patriotic one. I have found no notion of defending the British way of life and values, and only the odd mention of the British liberating Spain and Europe from Napoleon, - seen as the British doing the others a favour in fighting their war, rather than having interests in its outcome themselves. Most soldiers seem to have had little idea of why they were fighting, perhaps they did not give it much consideration,

- *''Their's not to reason why,*
Their's but to do or die,''

Honour was based on courage and endurance, overcoming fear and not hanging back from the enemy. The honour of British troops as a body was the extension of each individual's personal honour, i.e. one's self-esteem and reputation among one's companions. This concept was strongest in the ideal of the officer being a gentleman, e.g. the officers of the 10th Hussars, were so disgusted with their colonel for repeatedly refusing to let them charge at the battle of Orthes, they signed a 'round robin' not to speak to him. However, the importance of one's reputation seems to have been felt as much among the rank and file as among the officers, at least in the elite regiments. Harris (of the 95th) wrote, *''It is, indeed, singular, how a man loses or gains caste with his comrades from his behaviour, and how closely he is observed-in the field. The officers too are commented upon and closely observed.''* Those who dropped out from the march when they had only a minor illness or wound, or who disappeared without excuse, were called 'skulkers' and censured by the men. The night before Waterloo, only one man was absent from Tomkinson's squadron. When he returned from plundering, on the morning of the battle, he was booted by his comrades. In battle, Harris remembered ''only one British soldier endeavouring to hold back when his comrades were going forward'' and he was later removed to a veteran battalion, because he was a bad influence on the men.

This sense of personal honour was also seen in British soldiers' strong feelings for the honour and reputation of their regiments, deliberately instilled in them from their first joining. These feelings were particularly identified with the regiment's standards, - the King's and Regimental Colours. Lieutenant Edward Macready at Waterloo, was most relieved when the colours of the 30th Foot were taken to the rear; and Morris tells of how after the loss of their colour at Quatre Bras, the officers of the 69th set tailors to work to make a new one, to dispute the loss. But, according to Morris, the deceit was unnecessary for if a colour was taken while contending *''a vastly superior force it cannot reflect any disgrace on the men.''* Some soldiers also felt an association with other regiments with whom they had fought, e.g. the 95th, 52nd, and 43rd in the Peninsula, and the 42nd Highlanders and the Scots Greys after Waterloo.

British soldiers naturally appreciated credit and glory for their regiments and for the army as a whole. Lt. Gen. Robert Long was most annoyed with Marshal Beresford for not giving credit to the 13th Dragoons (one of the regiments in Long's brigade) for the action at Campo Major (12th April, 1811). For Kincaid, there was *''nothing in this life so enviable as the feelings of a soldier after a victory''*, and for a soldier of the 5th Dragoon Guards, the entry of the British into Madrid in 1812, to the greetings and applause of the inhabitants, was *''one of the brightest moments of my existence, all hardships and sufferings were forgotten in the spirit of the stirring scene around us.''*

The honour and glory of British arms was part and parcel of the great self confidence British soldiers felt. This is evident in the journals, letter collections and memoirs from the beginning of the Peninsular War, and is by no means just hindsight on victory, or patriotic license. It was a confidence in themselves and their leaders which was felt even in the most disastrous of retreats; - of the road to Corunna, Thomas of the 71st wrote, *''From the first moment of the attack, and as long as the French were before us, discipline was restored .... We felt not our sufferings, so anxious were we to end them by a victory, which we were certain of obtaining.''* Doubtless though, much of their confidence was built on experience of the leadership of Wellington who never lost a battle. Two drunks in September 1811 named him as the *''long-nosed*

beggar that licks the French.'' Costello recorded the almost unbounded confidence of the Light Division at Ciudad Rodrigo, and Kincaid remembered the British troops at Salamanca being filled with *''the most devoted confidence in their leader, and an invincible confidence in themselves.''*

Much of this confidence was due to the personality of Wellington himself who in his handsome and distinctive features, smart but unostentatious dress, cool and severe personal style but good humoured nature, together with his deep understanding and care for the troops, - inspired in them loyalty and devotion, order and discipline. His coming had an electric effect on the men, particularly at Waterloo, - *''"The Duke .... was coolness personified .... No leader ever possessed so fully the confidence of his soldiers .... Wherever he appeared, a murmur of 'Silence - stand to your front - here's the Duke.' was heard through the columns, and then all was steady as on a parade.'"* (Macready).

Wellington had all the qualities of a great leader, - many of which were also embodied in his subordinates. Although M. Glover is going too far in writing that they *''almost without exception''* understood the art of leadership, undoubtedly many officers did inspire their men. As seen above, most officers were by definition regarded as gentlemen, especially those from aristocratic or gentry families, the leaders of British society. Harris had a clear impression of who was a gentleman and their advantages, *''in our army the men like best to be officered by gentlemen, men whose education has rendered them more kind in manners than your coarse officer, sprung from obscure origin, whose style is brutal and overbearing, ... it requires one who has authority in his face, as well as at his back, to make them (the English) respect and obey him''*. Sergeant majors showed that command *''does not suit ignorant and coarse-minded men''*, and some soldiers were driven to insubordination by being worried by *''little-minded men''* for trifles about which gentlemen would never torment them.

The soldiers most respected those officers who showed care and concern for their physical welfare, those who *''filled their bellies''*. This concern was particularly shown when necessity demanded food or firewood from the local population, not formally requisitioned by the Commissary. In June 1813, Wheeler's battalion was allowed to fill their haversacks with wheat and rye from the roadside, as they had had no bread issued for nine days. Wellington issued constant and stringent orders against the taking of timber from houses for fire-wood, but officers would not enforce them because this was often the only fuel they could find to cook the rations.

The ranks also naturally appreciated officers who showed tactical ability on the battlefield, e.g. in leading them out of a scrape without loss, and those officers who led by example and with courage. Captain Mercer of 'G' Troop, Royal Horse Artillery at Waterloo, having reproved his men for lying down when shells burst, felt he could not do so when one landed at his feet, *''I stood, endeavouring to look quite composed until the cursed thing burst,''* - and as it did not injure him, *''the effect on my men was good.''* General Crauford was one of the very first killed at the head of the forlorn hope at Badajoz, and Costello's epitaph shows him to have been a successful leader, - he was *''a gallant veteran; who though most strict in discipline was averse to punishment and beloved by the men for his justice and care for them, as well as for his bravery.''* Crauford also had that touch of eccentricity which was particularly appreciated and remarked upon by the soldier - authors, a quality that was in Wellington, and some of his junior officers, e.g. Wheeler's Colonel Mainwaring, and Harris' Major Travers *''a regular good 'un''* who at Vimiero offered a guinea to any man who could find his wig!

Officers of course are the key figures in all the actions of a military unit, and were particularly important in Napoleonic warfare when virtually all movement, especially for the infantry, was based on specific, laid-down manoeuvres of massed bodies of men. Whether it was a company in a line twenty to thirty men wide, or a battalion of ten companies in line, the manoeuvres required were complex, precise and difficult to execute, and had to be instilled into officers and men by repeated drill and practice. Their primary purpose was to bring as much firepower to bear on the enemy as possible, - numbers being crucial with the inaccurate, short-ranged, smooth-bore musket, the standard infantry weapon. But the firing lines also had to contract into denser formations, e.g. an oblong square to face the threat of cavalry. Being trained to fight in large line formations, and to maintain the order of the ranks at all times greatly added to a soldier's confidence. It induced feelings of safety in numbers, comradeship and solidarity, which were an important part of the Napoleonic soldier's battlefield morale. *''While order subsists, the soldier feels his advantage, exerts himself, and acts with energy and spirit. When disorder prevails he perceives his inferiority, desponds, loses all confidence in himself or commander, personal safety soon occurs, and the moment of flight is not far distant".*

Only 'light' troops were trained to fight in open order and to rely on their own initiative, e.g. - to make the best use of the terrain, and not to rely entirely on the word of command. They were skirmishing troops who scouted, formed advance pickets and harassed the enemy in larger battles. Light infantry were trained to shoot accurately at a target rather than just pointing the weapon in the direction of the enemy and relying on numbers to make effect. They were aware of their superior training, and regiments like the 52nd, 43rd and especially the 95th (which had a disproportionate number of writing members) had an extra confidence and regimental pride, - 'esprit de corps'. They were the Light Division generally referred to as THE Division, the cream of Wellington's army. Yet for these the order of the ranks was by no means irrelevant, for the 43rd and 52nd were armed with muskets and therefore often fought in close order, and the 95th Rifles marched in column like any other regiment and occasionally had to form square against the threat of cavalry.

It was the drill and training of the troops, the authority commanded by their officers and the threat of punishment, their patriotism, and sense of duty, honour and pride in their regiment, their confidence in themselves and their leaders, as well as the restraints of their humanity and concept of the rules of war, - that made up the overall 'discipline' and morale of a unit. Richard Glover has written, *''it is a vulgar error to*

confound discipline with uniformity of conduct inspired by fear of punishment. Essentially discipline means loyal co-operation towards a common end. It reaches its peak in the team spirit that leads a good rugby side or boat race crew to obey its coach without the suggestion of penalties ever being made; .... some might indeed call a team spirit in a military unit 'good morale', but good morale and good discipline are Siamese twins. There is no separating them. Discipline declines whenever morale deteriorates and so does morale when discipline becomes lax, for the enthusiasm, which forms so large a part of morale, cannot co-exist with the slackness that leaves unpunished the bad or lazy soldier who lets his unit down. So discipline, morale and punishment all hang together.'' It was British soldiers' discipline, and the enthusiasm of their morale that enabled them to undergo the 'hard pounding' that were battles like Albuera and Waterloo; and to repeatedly endeavour, in-the face of horrendous casualties, to get over the breaches of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz.

The men of the 'forlorn hope', the first storming party that had to establish entry into a town or fortress for the rest of the troops, were particularly at risk, and were made up of volunteers from each regiment. The walls at Badajoz were thirty feet high with a sixteen foot ditch; there was no cover but darkness, and even this was destroyed by the enemy's fireballs, and the flash of muskets and cannon. Its storming cost 3,713 casualties. Yet there was never any shortage of volunteers, indeed there could be quite fierce competition. Bugler West bribed the sergeant with two dollars to take William Green's place, among the 95th, though the lots had been drawn, but Green wouldn't have it and reported the situation to the adjutant. Kincaid was obliged to leave his baggage in the charge of a wounded man because his servant insisted on going. Such courage was not just motivated by fear of the lash, or just a strong pride in the regiment, though this was undoubtedly a factor. There were inevitably many different motivations for volunteering for a forlorn hope. Green wanted to go *''where my duty calls me''*; for Kincaid, *''it had ever been the summit of my ambition to obtain a post at the head of a storming party''*. According to Surtees, Lt. Harvest of the 43rd, having been recommended for the captaincy of a company, insisted on being its senior member in the forlorn hope at Badajoz, for not to claim this post might have been construed as detrimental to his honour. A lieutenant who led a forlorn hope contingent and survived was virtually guaranteed promotion to the crucial rank of captain, without having to purchase.

Thus courage, ambition, glory, duty and honour, were all concerns and aspects of British troops, - as were their drill discipline, comradeship, confidence and patriotism, rapacity and debauchery, humanity and concepts of the rules of war. All these came to the fore in British soldiers at different times, depending on the situation they were in. Taken as a whole, they add up to the mentality of British campaign life in the Peninsular War, which was a product of the men's back-grounds and experiences. Yet it was also itself an influence on the experiences of the men, - on the march, during a siege, and particularly, on their reactions in battle.

In Battle

A large pitched Napoleonic battle like Albuera, Vitoria and Waterloo could be a surreal experience. The voluminous smoke which muskets and cannons (using black gunpowder), belched forth, their heat, and that of personal physical exertion, the terrific noise from the guns, and the cries of men and horses, are described by various writers, particularly Mercer, as having a dream, or nightmare-like quality, - *''We breathed a new atmosphere - the air was suffocatingly hot, resembling that issuing from an oven. We were enveloped in thick smoke, and, in spite of the incessant roar of cannon and musketry, could distinctly hear around us a mysterious humming noise, like that which one hears of a summer s evening proceeding from myriads of black beetles".* Mercer's memories of Waterloo, set down in his journal a few days afterwards, were somewhat confused, especially about the later part of the day when he was *''fatigued and almost deaf.''* Not surprisingly then, a battle produced in its participants a variety of feelings and attitudes which were largely unique to it, and which contributed to the morale, and so the actions of British soldiers. Naturally fear was probably the dominant emotion for most men, - perhaps at its worst in the immediate period before an expected battle started. However for some, like Surtees, it may have been less strong from *''a consciousness of superiority and good prospect of success.''* It also apparently decreased considerably once one was in action; - Wheeler became quite 'indifferent' to his personal safety; and Hennell wrote that *''After viewing the enemy you feel at the word 'Fall in' (more) than you do when the first ball passes and less as they increase.''* Concentrating on physical activity, e.g. following the drill of loading a musket (twenty movements), or a cannon, - in giving little time to think and look about one's position, - to some extent also averted troops' feelings of fear, and awareness of what was going on around them. Mercer's guns, faced by French cavalry at Waterloo, were served with *''astonishing activity''*, for *''the safety of all, everything, depended upon not slackening our fire.''* Inactivity during a battle, particularly when one was being shot at was *''the most unpleasant thing that can happen to soldiers in an engagement.''* (Leeke)

But it was mainly the discipline or morale of British troops that overcame their innate fear and natural inclination to flee from danger, and the continual threats of pain and death that faced them in battle. They were remarkably 'steady' troops able to undergo very heavy fire, or to face and await the advance of imposing and daunting enemies, and still maintain their order and discipline, and respond to their officers' commands. Taking examples from Waterloo, the most written-about battle;- many units suffered heavy casualties, including Mercer's battery, and especially the 27th Foot, the Inniskillings, who stood for four hours at the La Haye Saint crossroads during which they lost 450 out of the 750 officers and men. By comparison, the Brunswickers, (who were generally regarded like the Spanish and Dutch-Belgians as a poorer class of soldier) - drawn up in square behind Mercer's battery, appeared so unsteady under the artillery fire they were receiving, that Mercer resolved to disobey Wellington's orders for gunners to retire to the infantry squares when threatened, lest it signal the Brunswickers also to take flight. Several writers tell of the fear and trepidation they felt at the imposing

advance of the massed French cavalry (ordered forward by Marshal Ney in mid-afternoon), and the infantry of the French Imperial Guard (around 7pm), both of which were *''certainly enough to inspire a feeling of dread.''* Yet the British and allied squares repulsed the repeated charges of the French cavalry, and the Imperial Guard were routed in the usual way, which had often been employed throughout the Peninsula, - of holding fire until the enemy were about thirty yards away, and delivering a devastating volley, followed by a charge.

''No movement in the field is made with greater confidence of success than that of the charge; it affords little time for thinking, while it creates a fearless excitement, and tends to give a fresh impulse to the blood of the advancing soldier, rouses his courage, strengthens every nerve, and drowns every fear of danger or death; thus emboldened, amidst the deafening shouts that anticipate victory, he rushes on and mingles with the flying foe.'' There is perhaps a little exaggeration in this, - and Anton was in the 42nd Highlanders which was one of the 'crack' regiments in the British army; but it does express the excitement and fearlessness, even exhilaration, which was engendered by a charge. This was particularly so in a cavalry charge when the speed and sound of the galloping horses added to the thrill.

But the charge also needed considerable discipline and high morale, for to be successful, the participants had to be determined. A cavalry charge against other cavalry involved trotting or galloping straight towards, and through the enemy's ranks, which must have required strong nerves, - and against an infantry square, could largely only be successful if the imposing look of the cavalry could frighten the infantry into breaking their ranks or surrendering. Experience taught that when cavalry charged infantry, not in square, or when cavalry charged cavalry, or infantry charged infantry, the most determined side would almost always 'break' the enemy by the shock of contact. This often physically disordered their ranks, but mainly, and more impor tantly it broke them mentally, i.e. their discipline and morale disintegrated into panic and mob rule, in which the unit turned and fled. Tomkinson wrote of a cavalry action at Fuentes de Onoro on the 3rd May, 1809, *''This is the only instance I have ever met with of two bodies of cavalry coming into opposition, and both sides standing, as invariably, as I have observed it, one or the other runs away.''* Captain Childers of the 11th Light Dragoons always charged with the greatest determination, and even against three times his numbers always succeeded. (Tomkinson)

The infantry generally used their bayonets against an enemy already in flight, and it seems that the only instance of a melée with bayonets, was at Roncesvalles on the 25th July, 1813. Just the look and sound of a charge by enthusiastic, shouting troops was enough to turn less disciplined troops, and could be successful against any enemy, (even the French Imperial Guard) when preceded by the 'shock' of a large musket volley at close range.

To some extent the 'enthusiasm' of British troops in a charge was artificial. It was whipped up by their officers and themselves, e.g. by cheering; - every British attack was preceded and accompanied by wild *''Hurrahs!''*, or slogans such as *''Scotland for ever.''* The French did the same when they attacked, *''huzzaing and shouting like madmen.''* Morale was also 'boosted' by music from drums, bugles, or pipes. While wounded, Wheeler longed to hear the ''soul-stirring

bugles again.'' Dundas recommended the use of drums in a charge for ''*inspiring and directing the attack.*''

The morale and discipline of British infantry was such that, throughout the Peninsular War, hardly any unit seems to have been routed. They were forced to retreat many times, in the face of superior numbers, or stir resistance, but I have found only one instance when they lost all discipline, ignored their officers, and fled, - such as Spanish troops did at Talavera, and much of the French army did at Vitoria and Waterloo. Of course this was to a large extent due to the successes of British strategy and tactics, but it was also due to the steadiness of their discipline and morale. Colborn's brigade at Albuera suffered the disaster, infantry most feared, - being charged by cavalry when unprepared and 1,250 out of 1,650 were killed, wounded or taken prisoner. Yet rather than flee, many troops banded together in groups of six or eight, and did the best they could to stand and fight. The same was done by the 69th and 42nd at Quatre Bras when unexpectedly attacked by French Lancers and Cuirassiers.

Concluding part next issue.

"OH, GO HANG A MONKEY!"

Bob Black, U.K.

That phrase, dating from an incident during the Napoleonic Wars is guaranteed to shut up anyone from Hartlepool. Or get you a punch in the mouth from that same Hartlepudlian.

Behind that phrase is a strange tale of how the people of Hartlepool met a monkey for the first time and assumed he was one of Bonaparte's spies.

A French ship was wrecked on the North West coast and all hands were lost. All save a sailor's pet monkey who swam ashore. Now the Hartlepudlians had never seen a monkey before and for that matter never seen a Frenchman. When the furry fellow swam ashore they used impeccable logic and deduced that he must be a Frenchie.

They interrogated the monkey but he refused to answer. So they tortured him and the furry fellow screamed and gibbered. No one could understand him, but then since he was French they assumed he was speaking in French, a language they couldn't understand.

Getting nowhere with the ''spy'' the people of Hartlepool hung the monkey.

Today's Hartlepudlians take umbrage when this story is told. I have a friend of over twenty five years standing whom I can stop in his tracks by saying ''OH, GO HANG A MONKEY!''

The story entered the folklore of the North West and there are various songs about the incident. The Teesside Fettlers (a North England folk Group) sing a totally incomprehensible version on one of their records. For those of you lucky enough to have missed them here's a few verses from another source.

In former times mid war an' strife,
The French invasion threaten'd life,
An all was armed to the knife,
The fisherman hung the monkey, O!
The fisherman wi' courage high,
Seized on the Monkey for a spy;
''Hang him!'' says yen; says another, ''He'll die!''
They did, and they hung the Monkey, O!''
Hammer his ribs, the thunnerin thief!
Pummel his pyet weel wi yor neef!
He's landed here for nobbut grief
He's aud Napoleon's uncky, O!
Thus to the Monkey all hands behaved;
''Cut off his whiskers!'' yen chap raved;
Another bawled out ''He's never been shaved''
And so commenced to scrape the Monkey, O!
They put him on a gridiron hot,
The Monkey then quite lively got,
He rowl'd his eyes tiv a' the lot;
For the Monkey agyen turned funky, O!
The a fisherman up te Monkey goes,
Saying ''hang him at yence, an end his woes!''
But the Monkey flew at him and bit off his nose
An' that raised the poor man's Monkey O!
They tried every means to mych him speak;
They tortor'd the Monkey till loud he did squeak:
Says yen, ''That's French,'' says another, ''It's Greek''
For the Fisherman had got druncky, O!
''He's all ower hair!'' sum chap did cry,
E'en up te summic cute and sly;
Wiv a cod' head then they closed an eye,
Afore they hung the Monkey, O!