


EMPIRES, EAGLES AND LIONS

DEDICATED TO NAPOLEONIC WARGAMING
EDITED BY THE NEW JERSEY ASSOCIATION
OF NAPOLEONIC WARGAMERS



GRENADIERS OF THE IMPERIAL GUARD UNDER HOWITZER FIRE
(SEE ARTICLE PAGES 21 TO 26)

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WHAT HAPPENED at MAGUILLA?

Continuation from

EEL 63 and 64

Note from Editor: We had for lack of space to delay the publication of several page article authored by Marc J. Stroch and James Norwig. The following was sent to EEL from Italy and is authored by Dr. Paolo Coturri.

MORE ON MAGUILLA by Dr. Paolo Coturri

I EEL 63 and 64 I read the forum on Maguilla (or Valencia de Torres for some French authors) and I think I can add some light to the matter:

(1) Page 110 from "I Serve", Regimental history of 3rd Carabiniers, Jarrold and Sons, Norwich, 1966, by LT. Col. L.B. Oatts. I must mention that the author does not quote his source, however since I have appreciated some other works (The Gordons Rgt. History etc.) I think it is of value:

Slade's brigade, now consisting only of the 3rd Dragoon Guards and Royals, was ordered toward Liera to cover his northern flank, but General Slade was instructed on no account to become involved in any serious engagement. It so happened however, that the Comte d'Erlon had sent forward a Brigade of Dragoons under General Lallemand at the same time, with orders to march on Liera.

The 3rd Dragoon Guards and Royals were dismounted in front of a wood, when their patrols encountered General Lallemand riding forward with the French 17th Dragoons. Not knowing what might lie behind the wood, the French retired at a smart pace, upon which the 3rd Dragoon Guards and Royals mounted and set off after them at a canter. Soon overtaking the enemy, both regiments charged and cut them down right and left, taking well over one hundred prisoners. Slade should then have halted the brigade but instead of doing so allowed the regiments to disperse in pursuit, when a hunt developed which lasted nearly three leagues—upwards of nine miles. The French remnant finally galloped into a ravine with the disorganised British still hard on their tails to find, on emerging from the ravine, the remainder of the French brigade drawn up in line beyond. The British were then hunted in their turn right back to Valencia de las Torres before they could rally, by which time they had lost most of their prisoners. The 3rd Dragoon Guards lost sixty-seven men and eighty-five horses taken by the enemy, besides thirteen men killed. In his despatch, General Slade wrote, "nothing could exceed the gallantry displayed by the officers and men on this occasion. Colonel Sir Granby Calcraft and Lieutenant-Colonel Clifton, commanding the two regiments, particularly distinguished themselves, as well as all the officers present." Wellington however was furious, for it was just the sort of affair which he particularly disliked. There is no knowing what he might have done, had not the two regiments redeemed themselves on the following day, when Lieutenant Strenowitz, aide-de-camp to Sir William Erskine, one of the divisional commanders, ambushed a strong enemy foraging party at Maguilla with a troop each from the 3rd Dragoon Guards and Royals. The French Dragoons were on the line of march and just about to enter a village when they were charged by this detachment, with the troop of the 3rd, commanded by Troop-Sergeant-Major McClelland, in the lead. Being taken by surprise they offered little resistance and a large number were taken prisoner. This fortunate success enabled General Slade to send a flag of truce to General Lallemand and recover by exchange the prisoners lost by the 3rd Dragoon Guards and Royals on the previous day. It also saved both him and the two regiments from the wrath of Wellington.



(2) In "La Bataille des Arapilles", by Dr. Jean Sarramon, Edition Université de Toulouse-Le Mirail, 1978, the author enters in greater detail and definitely put the force of the French at two squadrons of the 17th Dragoons and two squadrons of the 27th Dragoons, about 500 men. The counterattack was performed by two squadrons of the 27th Dragoons, about 250 men. Clark-Kennedy was not the first eye-witness to fail to appreciate the strength of a cavalry force charging unex unexpectedly from a flank!!

Sarramon gives the following sources: Fortescue, Napier, Oman, Oatts, Tomkinson and the reports of Slade to Hill, Soult to Joseph and, I think, the most authoritative, General Gazan's report: "Rapport Des Operations de l'Armée du Midi pendant le Mois de Juin 1812" (Archives Historiques de la Guerre C8 97, i.e. Official French Archives "Guerre")

The strengths on the 1st of June were: 17th Dragoons (3 squadrons) 308+131, and 27th Dragoons (4 squadrons) 271+208. The second number refers to depots, detached and garrison troops.

I hope I have been useful to the friends of EEL.

NOTE FROM EDITOR. We certainly appreciate receiving such complete data traceable to Official Archives. I should point out that a copy of the pertinent part of Dr. Sarramon's book was sent to EEL by David Naquin. Once more thank you for your help Gentlemen.

MORE ON ROYALIST UNITS IN CHILE by David E. Steward

In Issue #61, I briefly discussed Royalist units serving in Chile during the Latin American Wars of Independence. As is fairly common in beginning research, I posed nearly as many questions as I answered. As fate (or the benign god of amateur writers) would have it, "Campaigns" issue Number 39 contains a very good article on the Argentine Army of the Andes. (Allison, Alberto and Allison, Antonio; "The Andean Liberation Army"), which also contains some incidental information on Royalist forces. The following specific points I raised in Issue #61 are answered:

- (A) The Volunteers of Chile are identified as an infantry battalion.
- (B) The Carabiniers of Abascal are identified as a cavalry regiment.
- (C) The Talavera Infantry Regiment is shown to have had only one battalion at Chacabuco.
- (D) An additional Royalist provincial infantry battalion is identified, the Valdivia Battalion.

Additionally, in this article, there is a black and white illustration of a painting of the Battle of Rancagua that clearly shows the Royalists wearing the white uniforms referred to in Rojas' San Martin, Knight of the Andes. In this case they seem to be wearing the British style cylindrical shako.

I would recommend this article to anyone interested in the period. Chacabuco would seem to be ideal miniatures battle, having on one side a light and three line battalions, five cavalry squadrons, and part of an artillery battalion. On the other side were two battalions and part of another and 24 cavalry squadrons with two guns. Though outnumbered badly, the Royalists were in an excellent defensive position, and were fighting a rearguard action. Their mission was to delay until re-inforcements would arrive. (The number of units might seem small for a war game, but I confess that I like big battalions of a 1:10 or 1:15 ratio).



SOME COMMENTS AND CONSIDERATIONS ON FRENCH TACTICS, PART I

by Jean A. Locht

It's quite obvious that my article in EEL#65 (pages 16 to 19) had to be completed. Several times I have authored articles on French tactics showing that the French infantry, when in columns, intended to deploy or deployed. I don't intend to go back on that (). I have presented Primary sources on that. However, there are also the other PRIMARY SOURCES that show, with equal reliability, that, on some very specific occasions French columns did not deploy and did not even intend to deploy.

We are back to the old controversy of the ordre mince versus the ordre profond which began as soon as the heavy rectangles, in which the infantry still fought during the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1714), had thinned into the elongated fragile lines of the 1730's, caused by the improvement of the firearms. Many partisans of the ordre profond, like de Saxe, distrusted the effectiveness of the firearms (already the controversy on the "Firepower Syndrome!") and even advocated the return to the pike...

The controversy had not been settled by 1791 when the Ordinance of August 1791 was published. An analysis of the text of the Ordinance shows that it does not advocate any specific formation, line or column, for an attack. In fact, a minimum of constraint is placed on tactical arrangements. The Ordinance is nothing more than a procedure book covering columns, squares, lines, how to go from one formation to another etc.. So, one must look somewhere else for the tactical doctrine governing the formations used by the French generals of the Revolution and of the Empire.

Several books analyse the French ordinance of August 1791 as well as the history of French infantry tactics (and infantry tactics in general) before the Revolution. For instance Quimby "The Background of Napoleonic Warfare", Columbia Press, New York, 1957, does cover the Ordinance of 1791 quite extensively and compares it with previous ordinances. Quimby, more or less simply translates in English the ideas and the thesis of Colin to be found in "L'Infanterie au XVIIIe Siecle" and "La Tactique et la Discipline Dans les Armées de la Revolution". The question is also debated, less extensively, by Paret in "Yorck and the Era of Prussian Reforms, 1807-1815", Princeton University Press, 1966.

I can only recommend to read Quimby for the complete study on the evolution of infantry tactics before the French Revolution. It shows very clearly that the Ordinance of 1791 was not a revolutionary document by any means. As a matter of facts it was even a regression from earlier tactical developments (see for instance the Ordinance of 1788 etc.). However, I think it's appropriate to give a word of caution to the readers. As mentioned above, Quimby takes over the thesis of Collin, saying that the French when in columns always wanted or intended to deploy...

Note 1. In EEL 58, p.23 to 27, John Koontz covers the different formations used at Jena and Auerstadt by the French infantry.

In Part I of our article, we don't have the space to elaborate further on that controversy. In our next issue, in Part II, we'll try to cover briefly the systems and principles of both sides, i.e. Mesnil-Durand for the 'ordre profond' and Guibert for the 'ordre mince'.

Let us consider now some instances in which some columns were formed with no intention of deploying with some very specific tactical purposes or considerations.

(1) MacDonald's column at Wagram. MacDonald's column at Wagram is certainly, with Derlon's column at Waterloo, one of the most controversial column used during the Napoleonic period. Many comments have been made by many SECONDARY SOURCES they can be summed up by:

- (1) MacDonald's column was a monstrous formation
- (2) MacDonald had to use that massive column because of the deterioration of the French infantry and/or the poor unreliable morale of his troops.

Where MacDonald's troops raw recruits? Were they unreliable? Why MacDonald used his massive column? Can we find some PRIMARY SOURCES to answer the above questions?

MacDonald's column at Wagram included 3 divisions: Broussier, Seras and Lamarque divisions. Like the rest of MacDonald troops they were part of the Army of Italy which had fought from Italy to Wagram several battles against the Austrian troops under the Archduke John.

A quick glance at battle reports shows that the Seras' division was at the battle of Raab where it behaved quite gallantly. (see note 2)

In the Broussier's division we find the famous 84th of the line which received a unique award from Napoleon (that is a silver plate proudly placed under the Eagles of the 1st and 2nd battalions of that regiment) reading "UN CONTRE DIX", i.e. One Against Ten) because of their splendid stand at Graz, against a very large Austrian force estimated at some 20000 men (see EEL 53, pages 34 & 35).

It is quite true that the 3 divisions had suffered considerable losses from Italy to Wagram and at the battle of Wagram. However, nothing can support the thesis that they were unreliable troops incapable of maneuvering! What I am saying above can be checked through official archives... So, I simply discard secondary sources pretending the contrary since they are simply in error and in contradiction with the archival truth.

But why MacDonald took such a formation in the first place? After a long stand under Austrian fire, MacDonald was ordered by Napoleon to attack the Austrians. Following is what MacDonald, himself, had to say in "Marshall MacDonald's Recollections", pages 337 & 338:

I therefore ordered four battalions, followed by four others which I deployed in two lines, to advance at the double; and while my artillery opened fire, and that of the Guard took up position (which the Emperor called the hundred gun battery), my two divisions formed themselves into attacking columns. The enemy, who were still advancing, halted; and, redoubling their fire, caused us terrible damage. However, in pro-

portion as my lines became unserviceable, I drew them up closer together, and made them dress as at drill. While I was doing this, I saw the enemy's cavalry preparing to charge, and had barely time to close my second line on the first one; they were flanked by the two divisions still in columns, and the square was completed by a portion of General Nansouty's cavalry that had been put under my orders since the morning. I ordered both ranks to open fire, my famous battery mowing down the cavalry. My hot fire broke them just as they were preparing to charge: many men and horses fell pierced by our bayonets. The smoke rising disclosed to me the enemy in the utmost disorder, which was increased by their attempt to retreat. I ordered an advance with levelled bayonets, after previously commanding Nansouty to charge, at the same time desiring the cavalry officers whom I saw behind me to do likewise. Unfortunately, they were not under my orders, and the Emperor was not there to give any.

It's hard to contest such a PRIMARY REFERENCE and interesting to find such a precise report on what happened. MacDonald was simply forced by circumstances to form a huge column to move forward while awaiting the charge of the Austrian cavalry. When the Austrian cavalry charge came the square was closed, then after the cavalry charge had been repulsed, the advance was resumed with levelled bayonets.

It's quite obvious that MacDonald did not intend to deploy such a huge formation (which was certainly a bite desorganized by the magnitude of the losses to say the least) for the simple reason he had not the space and that some 8 battalions were already deployed.

I should add a note here to point out that such huge infantry squares were not new. Divisional squares had already been used in Egypt by Bonaparte successfully...with a big difference: the Austrian artillery was not in Egypt.

(2) Desaix's Ordre Mixte at Marengo (or the Ordre-Mixte Within the Ordre-Mixte)

In Colonel R. Home's "A Precis of Modern Tactics", London, 1882, I found a picture of Desaix's advance at the Battle of Marengo. The picture is most interesting since it shows the 9th Light, 30th and 69th Demi-Brigade in Ordre-Mixte. We have reproduced that picture to show that such a formation was more linear than deep.

In fact the formation is an ordre-mixte within an ordre-mixte since the 30th Demi-brigade de ligne (only 2 battalions strong) was deployed in line between the 9th Demi-brigade légère (3 battalions) in ordre-mixte and the 69th Demi-brigade de ligne (3 battalions) also in ordre-mixte.

To be more precise, the leading demi-brigade, the 9th legere, had its

flank battalions in column of double companies and its centre battalion into line 3 deep. The 69th assumed the same formation and in between, the 30th demi-brigade was deployed in 3 deep line. The formation was taken because it offered good protection against the Austrian cavalry which was threatening to charge and also offered a very considerable firepower. It was pushed by Dessaix like a wedge in the Austrian position. The sequence of events is shown in the drawing (see note 3). The 9th Light advance, halts at half-range for a volley and charges. It routs the Austrian Regiment in front, then stops and resumes volley fire.

The charge of the 9th Light was helped by the artillery fire of a horse artillery battery.

The victory was completed by the judicious charge of Kellerman's cavalry.

It is clear that the column of the 9th Light could not deploy also for lack of space and achieved the object of the charge with the rest of the demi-brigade.

One can pretend that the column of a unit in ordre-mixte was not intended to deploy in the first place...well that could be perfectly so, but the end result is the same. The column did not intend to deploy in that case.

I am going to end here Part I. I have by no means exhausted the examples of French columns that did not deploy for one reason or another. I would like to receive more examples from the readerships (if possible from Primary references). As usual comments will be welcomed and documented.

Note 2. Serras' division, at the battle of Raab, was involved in the taking of the of Kis-Megyer and suffered considerable casualties before it finally took that farm.

Note 3. It should be noted here that the column of double companies, is considered as one of the best column to form a quick square when attacked by cavalry.

ADDITIONAL SOURCES: (1) Belhomme "Histoire de l'Infanterie en France" volume III, Paris, 1893-1902.

(2) Trané & Carmignani "Napoleon et l'Autriche" Paris, 1979

(3) Chandler "The Campaigns of Napoleon", New York, 1966

(4) Orders of Battles from misc. sources traceable or directly from official French archives.


(5) Latreille "L'oeuvre Militaire de la Revolution", Paris, 1914

(6) Jean Regnault "Les Armes Impériales", Paris, 1967.

(7) Past issues of EEL.

(8) Petre "Napoleon and the Archduke Charles" London 1976.

(9) Bowden & Tarbox "Armies on the Danube, 1809", 1980.



COMPARE ABOVE DRAWING WITH NEXT PAGE PICTURE, NOTE LINEAR FORMATION


69th Line.

30th Line.

9th Light.

BATTLE OF MARENGO. Dessaix's Advance.

Pageant, S.M.E., Chatham.



SOME COMMENTS AND CONSIDERATIONS ON FRENCH TACTICS, PART II

by Jean A. Lochet

In our last issue, page 23, we have seen some examples of French columns that did not intend to deploy. Today I intend to present a very interesting and very well known attack in columns, in which one column did try to deploy and another did not intend to deploy.

We are very fortunate in that particular instance to have PRIMARY SOURCES that are clear enough to understand what happened.

The celebrated attack of d'Erlon's Corps at Waterloo provides us with that very specific instance. I have used Houssaye's excellent "1815" (an account of the battle of Waterloo) as a source for the basic material I am using here.

Page 338 (French Edition) Houssaye tells us" (see note 1)

"...After half an hour of firing, the grande battery interrupted its fire to allow d'Erlon's infantry to move forward. The four divisions of that Corps moved forward in echelons on the left, with an interval of 400 yards between each echelon. The Allix's Division was the first echelon, the Donzelot's Division the second, Marcognet's Division the third and Durutte's Division the fourth. Ney and d'Erlon led the assault.

Instead of forming his troops in 'attack columns' (colonnes d'attaque), ie. in battalions columns by division, a tactical formation favorable to quick deployment as well as the quick formation of squares, each echelon had been formed in a mass of deployed battalions one behind the other. The Allix, Donzelot, Marcognet and Durutte Divisions so presented four phalanxes with a front of sixty to two hundred files and a depth of twenty four men..."

....

"The head of Allix's Division (Quiot's brigade) moved slightly to the left toward the orchard of la Haye-Sainte. Consequently, Bourgeois' brigade alone formed the left echelon and continued its march toward the British lines..."

On the East of the road (from Brussels to Charleroi) the other columns of d'Erlon's Corps continue their advance under the artillery fire and that of the 95th Foot and that of Byland's brigade deployed in front of Ohain's road...etc..."

Then page 342: (see note 2)

"The vicious formation of d'Erlon's columns, which had already increased the difficulties to march and doubled the losses during the forward march, was to be the cause of a disaster. After having pushed back the Dutch skirmishers of Byland's brigade, Donzelot's Division advanced 30 paces to that road. There, Donzelot stopped his column to deploy it. During the advance, the battalions had decreased their intervals and formed a compact mass. The deployment, or more exactly the attempt to deploy, because it does not appear

He fell at my feet, downed by a sabre blow. I looked upward. It was the British cavalry that was penetrating us everywhere and was cutting us to pieces..."

CONCLUSION. I have almost the feeling of presenting a technical paper for the simple reason I have practically nothing to do but simply present my data which is clear enough to show that:

- (1) Donzelot intended to deploy his column and
- (2) Marcognet did not since he believed the deployment impossible.

I do believe the above substantiate my statement to be found in EEL 65, page 17:

"I have authored several articles pretending that French columns were moving and maneuver formations not intended to attack but to deploy. There is sure plenty of evidences to support that point and I am not going to deny that, quite on the contrary. However, no one can deny that there is as much evidence supporting the fact that, on many occasions, French columns did not deploy and did not intend to deploy!"

I would go a step further. I simply believe that French columns deployed or did deploy according to circumstances (tactical or perhaps simply because of the tactical concept on a given moment of the French commander involved).

Obviously, once more, we should have plenty to talk about...

Note 1. Following are the French texts of the quoted pages 338 etc. of Houssaye's "1815":

Après une demi-heure de canonade, la grande batterie suspendit un instant son tir pour laisser passer l'infanterie de d'Erlon. Les quatre divisions marchaient en échelons par la gauche, à 400 mètres d'intervalle entre chaque échelon. La division Allix formait le premier échelon, la division Donzelot le deuxième, la division Marcognet le troisième, la division Durutte le quatrième. Ney et d'Erlon conduisaient l'assaut.

Au lieu de ranger ces troupes en colonnes d'attaque, c'est-à-dire en colonnes de bataillons par division à demi-distance ou à distance entière, ordonnance tactique favorable aux déploiements rapides comme aux formations en carrés, on avait rangé chaque échelon par bataillon déployé et serré en masse. Les divisions Allix, Donzelot, Marcognet et Durutte présentaient ainsi quatre phalanges compactes, d'un front de cent soixante à deux cents files sur une profondeur de vingt-quatre hommes.

Please note that Houssaye is giving his PRIMARY SOURCES for what he reports above. There are given below.

1. Rapport de Kempt, Genappe, 19 juin. (Wellington, *Supplementary*, X, 534.) *Souvenirs d'un vieux soldat belge*, 84. *Souvenirs d'un ex-officier*, 285-286. Mauduit, II, 293-295. Janin, *Camp de Waterloo*, 33. Kennedy, 107-108. Siborne, II, 3-5. Cotton, 62. Cf. Gourgaud, 92. Napoléon, *Mém.*, 143. Damitz, II, 292-291.

2. *Souvenirs d'un ex-officier*, 285-286. Mauduit, *Derniers jours de la Grande Armée*, II, 293. Note du général Schmitz, brigadier de Donzelot (comm. par le commandant Schmitz). Relation de Durutte (*Sentinelles de l'Armée*, mars 1838). Notes de Durutte (comm. par le commandant Durutte, de l'armée belge).

pages 339 and 340

(1) page 339:

La tête de la division Allix (brigade Quiot) se porta, par une légère conversion à gauche, contre le verger de la Haye-Sainte, d'où partait une fusillade très nourrie. La brigade Bourgeois, formant seule désormais l'échelon de gauche, continua sa marche vers le plateau. Les soldats de Quiot débûsquèrent

Note 2. French text of pages 342 and 343. Here again the footnote from Houssaye, identifying his source is also given.

La vicieuse ordonnance des colonnes de d'Erlon, qui déjà avait alourdi leur marche et doublé leurs pertes dans la montée du plateau, allait entraîner un désastre. Après que les tirailleurs eurent culbuté les Hollandais de Bylandt, la division Donzelot s'avance jusqu'à trente pas du chemin. Là, Donzelot ordonna sa colonne pour la déployer. Pendant l'escalade, les bataillons avaient encore resserré leurs intervalles. Ils ne formaient plus qu'une masse. Le déploiement ou plutôt la tentative de déploiement, car il ne semble pas que l'on ait réussi à l'exécuter, prit beaucoup de temps; chaque commandement augmentait la confusion. L'ennemi profita de ce répit. Quand les batteries françaises eurent ouvert le feu, la division Picton (brigades Kempt et Pack) s'était reculée, sur l'ordre de Wellington, à 150 mètres du chemin. Les hommes étaient lâs, en ligne, mais couchés afin d'éviter les projectiles. Picton voit les Hollandais en déroute et les tirailleurs

Houssaye's footnote:

1. Rapport de Kempt, Genappe, 19 juin. (Wellington, *Dispatches* Suppl., X, 534.) Fraser, *Letters*, 551. Lettres d'officiers de la division Picton et de la brigade Ponsonby. (Wellington's *Letters*, 70, 85, 89, 345, 349, 350, 356, 361, 363.) Kennedy, 109. W. Gomm, *Letters*, 359. Siborne, II, 11-11.

Siborne, entraîné par son patriotisme, dit que l'officier-français fut tué en essayant de reprendre le drapeau du 32^e français. Le 32^e n'était pas à l'armée du Nord, tandis que le 32^e anglais faisait bel et bien partie de la brigade Kempt.

Translation of the pertinent part of the above footnote:

"Siborne, carried over by his patriotism, says that the French officer was killed trying to recover the flag of the French 32nd of the Line. The 32nd was not with the Army of the North, but the 32nd Foot was indeed part of Kempt's brigade.

Note 3. Here again we have the French text of pages 343 and 344

La colonne de Marcognet (troisième échelon) était arrivée à peu près à la hauteur de la colonne de Donzelot, au moment de la fuite des Hollandais. Marcognet, n'ayant pas cru possible de déployer sa division, avait continué sa marche et dépassé Donzelot qui faisait halte. Déjà, avec son régiment de tête, criant : Victoire ! il avait franchi la double haie et s'avancait contre une batterie hanovrienne, quand, aux sons aigus des pibrochs, s'élança la brigade écossaise de Pack, par bataillons en échiquier déployés sur quatre rangs. A moins de vingt mètres (vingt yards), le 92^e highlanders

(2) page 340:

A l'est de la route, les autres colonnes de d'Erlon avaient gravi les rampes sous le feu des batteries, les balles du 95^e anglais et la fusillade de la brigade Bylandt, déployée en avant du chemin d'Ohain. La

français traverser les haies et s'avancer hardiment contre une batterie. Il commande : « Debout ! » et porte d'un bond la brigade Kempt jusqu'au chemin. Elle repousse les tirailleurs, franchit la première haie, puis, découvrant la colonne de Donzelot, occupée à se déployer, elle la salue d'un feu de file à quarante pas. Fusillés à l'improviste, surpris en pleine formation, les Français font d'instinct, involontairement, un léger mouvement rétrograde. Picton, saisisant la minute, crie : « Chargez ! Chargez ! Hurrah ! » Les Anglais s'élançant de la seconde haie et se ruent, baïonnettes en avant, contre cette masse en désordre qui résiste par sa masse même. Repoussés plusieurs fois, sans cesse ils renouvellent leurs charges. Un combat de si près que les boures restent fumantes dans le drapeau des habits. Durant ces corps-à-corps, un officier français est tué en prenant le drapeau du 32^e régiment, et l'intrépide Picton tombe roide mort, frappé d'une balle à la tempe.

NOTE FROM J. LOCHET. Following is, again, the translation of the footnote 1, to be found page 344 of Houssaye's "1815". It is of interest, since it brings the French version of one part of the battle of Waterloo to our readers. I am sure that what Houssaye says is going to be checked by some of our readers.

Translation of Houssaye's footnote:

"British historians do not want to accept (and why, since the Army of Wellington was victorious?) that during that first attack the French did reach the ridge of Mont-Saint-Jean (les cretes JAL). The "Waterloo Letters", all coming from officers that took an active part in the battle, acknowledge that:

1) On the British right, Travers' Cuirassiers came exactly to the border of Ohain road; - 2) On the left, Bourgeois' brigade also reached the Ohain road after it pushed back the defenders of the sand-pit (sablioniere); - 3) Donzelot's column stopped some 40 yards away from the road to deploy and that his skirmishers went behind the edges of the road; - 4) At least the leading battalions of Marcognet's column went behind the road, "Advanced onto the Hanoverian guns" and entered (s'engagerent) the upland (le plateau) against the Scotch of Pack's brigade. In his report to Wellington dated 19 June (Suppl. Dispatches, X, 534), Kempt expressly says that Picton's charge took place when the French took the ridge of the position, and that, in the few instants following, when Picton was killed, the situation was very critical. In a letter dated 23 June to Hervey, Aide-de-Camp to Wellington (Suppl. Dispatches of Wellington, X, 568), Colonel Clifton, replacing General Ponsonby, killed, says: "The enemy until then previously successful, was routed by our cavalry."

Following is the French text of the footnote:

1. Lettres d'officiers des brigades Kempt, Pack et Ponsonby. (*Waterloo Letters*, 64, 69, 355, 356, 371, 374, 382, 383, etc.) Cotton, 67-68. *Souvenirs d'un ex-officier* (du 45^e), 287, 288.

Les historiens anglais ne veulent point avouer (et pourquoi, puisque l'armée de Wellington fut victorieuse?) que dans cette première attaque les Français atteignirent les crêtes de Mont-Saint-Jean. Or les *Lettres de Waterloo*, provenant toutes d'officiers qui prirent part à la bataille, témoignent que : 1^o à la droite anglaise les cuirassiers de Travers arrivèrent exactement au bord du chemin d'Ohain ; - 2^o à la gauche, la brigade Bourgeois parvint aussi au chemin après avoir délogé les défenseurs de la sablonnière ; - 3^o la colonne de Donzelot s'arrêta pour se déployer à 40 mètres du chemin, et ses tirailleurs dépassèrent les haies ; - 4^o au moins les bataillons de tête de la colonne Marcognet franchirent le chemin, « s'avancèrent jusque sur les canons hanovriens » et s'engagèrent sur le plateau même contre les Écossais de Pack. Dans son rapport à Wellington du 19 juin (*Suppl. Dispatches*, X, 534), Kempt dit expressément que la charge de Picton eut lieu quand les Français emportaient la crête de la position, et que, même quelques instants après, quand Picton fut tué, la situation était très critique. Dans une lettre du 23 juin à Hervey, aide de camp de Wellington (*Suppl. Dispatches of Wellington*, X, 568), le colonel Clifton, qui remplaçait le général Ponsonby, tué, dit de son côté : « L'ennemi, jusque-là vainqueur (previously successful), fut mis en déroute par notre cavalerie. »

FURTHER COMMENTS FROM J. LOCHET. I would like to point out to the readership that Dr. Griffith, in a recent letter, was pointing out that Houssaye in "1815" made some mistakes (I should say that I am aware of at least one) and that, in order to get the right picture, one should read Houssaye with the "Waterloo Letters". The above extract from Houssaye is using the "Waterloo Letters". I think the above points are of interest.